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After the so-called refugee crises that began in 2015 in Europe, the number of child marriages 
within European borders have increased significantly. Even if it is undisputed that marriages 
concluded without a full, free and informed consent are prohibited in international law, child 
marriages, where the young child brides may not fully understand the nature and consequences of 
the union unfortunately do happen all over the world and many jurisdictions still accept the 
practice. Therefore, it is not uncommon that young refugee girls migrating to Europe are married. 
The migrating child brides have given rise to heated debates about the extent of EU States’ 
obligations towards the recognition of such marriages. The question is, in what circumstances 
should a child marriage concluded abroad be recognized in EU Member States and when is it 
acceptable under international law to refuse to recognize the legal validity such marriage?  
 
There is no absolute obligation of non-recognition of a child marriage concluded abroad in 
international instruments but during the recent decade, there has been a trend in Europe towards a 
total ban on such marriages; already five States have enacted laws prohibiting entirely the 
recognition of foreign child marriages and thus automatically limiting the child brides’ right to 
family life and at times exposing the child to the risk of torture or ill-treatment. States that have 
refused to recognize foreign child marriages have become subjects of debate on whether they are 
conforming their international obligations by automatically limiting the rights of the child brides 
but on the contrary, the recognition of a child marriage may mean that the recognizing State 
tolerates severe human rights violations within its State borders.  
 
This thesis is a doctrinal study that analyses the extent of EU States’ obligations with respect to 
foreign child marriages by analysing the situations where limitations on the child brides’ right to 
family life and prohibition of torture under the European Convention on Human Rights may be 
justified. The conclusion that is drawn is that limitations on the right to family life are allowed 
within the limits of the principle of proportionality and margin of appreciation and that under the 
principle of ordre public States do not have to enforce a foreign marriage if it is against the public 
policy and morals of that State. Nevertheless, derogation from prohibition of torture is not possible. 
In situations where both the child marriage as well as its non-recognition would expose the child 
to torture or ill-treatment, the States must exercise due diligence in preventing and addressing the 
possible violations and the decisions concerning the marriage shall be made according to the 
standard of the best interests of the child. 
 
There is no straightforward answer to the primary question of this thesis, but this study argues that 
a total ban on the recognition of foreign child marriages violates the States’ obligations under 
international human rights law. Each child marriage should be considered on an individual basis 
taking into consideration the interests of the State and the child, with the best interests of the child 
as the primary consideration. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
 
The untypically high refugee flows since 2015 have brought a new type of problem on the doorstep 
of European States, namely migrating ‘child brides’.1 Child marriage is a common practice in the 
developing world because of false believes regarding the best interest of children, traditions and 
economic needs,2 but it has also become more and more common among populations living in conflict 
zones and refugee camps where young girls and their families are in need of protection from sexual 
harassment and violence committed by men who see vulnerable families as easy targets.3 
Consequently, there has been a significant increase in the number of child marriages in Europe 
because it is not unusual that the young girls who migrate to Europe are married at young age.4 Even 
if child marriages are often concluded according to the laws of the home countries of the child brides,5 
European countries have faced dilemmas as to the recognition of the marriages concluded abroad 
because according to international law, child marriage is a fundamental human rights violation.6 It 
affects both directly and indirectly several human rights of the girls and may even lead to death or 
lifetime suffering. Child marriage is addressed in several human rights instruments but yet, it is 
estimated that by 2030, an additional 150 million adolescent girls will get married before they reach 
the age of 18.7 The increasing number of child brides crossing into Europe has triggered a heated 
debate in European States on whether child marriages concluded abroad should be tolerated in Europe 
or not. 
 
                                                
1 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Thirty-first session, Agenda item 3, ‘Promotion and protection of all 
human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development’, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/57 
(2016), para. 64. 
2 UNFPA’s Action for Adolescent Girls, ‘Building the health, social and economic assets of adolescent girls, especially 
those at risk of child marriage’, Programme Document, 2014, p. 3, see also United Nations Population Fund, topics – 
‘Child marriage’. Available from: https://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage (8.11.2019). 
3 El Arab, R., and Sagbakken, M., ‘Child marriage of female Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: a literature review’, 
Global Health Action 2019, Vol 12, 1585709, 2018, p. 1 and pp. 5-6. 
4 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, UNGA 
A/HRC/31/57 (2016), para. 64, see also Plan International: ‘Child marriages creeping into Europe’. Available from: 
https://www.plan.ie/stories/child-marriage-europe/ (17.11.2019). 
5 Girls Not Brides: ‘Where does it happen?’ Available from: https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/where-does-it-happen/atlas 
(25.3.2020). 
6 See chapter 2.2. 
7 UNICEF Data: ‘Child marriage’, October 2019. Available from: https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/child-
marriage/ (29.2.2020). 
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Child marriage is a widespread problem affecting all regions of the world in one way or another.8 
Even if most child marriages are concluded in developing States or within conflict zones, they do 
happen all over the world, including Europe.9 As the rest of the international community, European 
States have made a lot of efforts to abolish the harmful practice but based on the debates around the 
issue in Europe, it can be assumed that the European States have certainly not been prepared for the 
current situation where the issue affects the entire continent as significantly as it now does.10 They 
have been forced to confront a major legal dilemma; if they accept child marriages concluded in third 
States, they simultaneously accept human rights violations within their State borders. On the other 
hand, separating these children from their husbands who may be the only family the children have left 
violates several other rights, like the child brides’ right to respect for family life. Furthermore, being 
married affects the child brides’ possibility to permanent residence within European borders while a 
married child is not entitled to the protection of refugee children as their husbands are assumed to 
have responsibility for them. Again on the other hand, being married can in some situations ease the 
child brides’ access to Europe on grounds of family reunification.11 
 
So, the question is, which rights should prevail? If States separate the child brides from their 
husbands, are they protecting the rights of the girl, or violating the married couples’ right to family 
life? There is no straightforward answer to whether child marriages should be recognized in Europe 
or not. Moreover, not much has been written of the topic as it is a rather recent problem. However, 
during the past few years, European States have been forced to re-examine their legislation and 
policies and a few States have already taken steps towards combatting the problem by banning child 
marriages completely within their State borders. The measures taken within these States have led to 
heated discussions of the legal dilemmas arising from the non-recognition of child marriages and it 
can arguably be said that the dilemma of the migrating child brides remains as a ‘grey zone’ in 
international law, making it an important topic for research. 
 
  
                                                
8 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, UNGA 
A/HRC/31/57 (2016) para. 63. 
9 Girls Not Brides: ‘Child Marriages Around the World’ Available from: https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/where-does-it-
happen/ (29.2.2020). 
10 See chapter 2.5. 
11 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs: ‘Family Reunification’, available from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/family-reunification_en (04.05.2020), see also 
chapter 2.3. 
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1.2. Aim and Methodology 
 
This thesis is a doctrinal study of the migrating child brides whose status, when arriving within the 
European borders is a debated issue in EU States. The main issue is the fact that there are no explicit 
international or regional provisions on how child marriages concluded abroad should be addressed in 
Europe. While marriages concluded without a full, free and informed consent are prohibited in Europe 
per se,12 a married child arriving to the continent brings about several legal dilemmas where the rights 
of the child are at stake. There have been differences in how EU States have responded to the 
migrating child brides but no simple answer on how they should respond. The primary aim of this 
thesis is to provide a legal analysis of the extent of EU States’ obligations towards the recognition of 
child marriages concluded abroad. The primary question to which this thesis seeks an answer is the 
following: 
 
In what circumstances should a child marriage concluded abroad be recognized in EU Member States 
and when is it acceptable under international law to refuse to recognize the legal validity of such 
marriage? 
 
In order to achieve this aim, it is important to first briefly discuss the issue of child marriage in general 
and how international law prohibits the practice. An analysis of the international normative 
framework conceptualizes the States’ obligations regarding child marriages in general and thus brings 
legal weight to the further analysis of child marriages concluded abroad. Thereafter, the focus will be 
put on child marriages in the context of migration and on the responses of EU States with regard to 
the problem. Thereafter, this thesis will provide an analysis of the international instruments 
addressing the recognition of child marriages. Is there an explicit obligation not to recognize a child 
marriage concluded abroad in the current international normative framework?  
 
The thesis will next move on to the legal dilemmas caused by the recognition - as well as the non-
recognition of child marriages by discussing the fundamental rights a child marriage in the context 
of migration affects with a focus on peremptory norms of international law and the right to respect 
for private and family life. Firstly, peremptory norms of international law are discussed in general 
and the International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles) and its application on child marriages is analysed. Next, the focus will 
                                                
12 See chapter 2.2. 
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be put on the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment and on how both the recognition, as well as the 
non-recognition of a foreign child marriage may lead to violations of Article 3. The positive 
obligation of States to secure the rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) to everyone within their jurisdiction and the principle of due diligence will as well be 
discussed in conjunction with the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. Finally, the chapter will 
discuss how the non-recognition of a foreign child marriage affects the child brides’ right to respect 
for family life and how States positive obligations with respect to human rights may impose an 
obligation on States to recognize a child marriage concluded abroad. 
 
In order to answer the primary question of this study, in the last chapter of this thesis, the scenarios 
deriving from both the recognition and the non-recognition of child marriages will be balanced with 
principles of international law allowing and limiting restrictions to the rights enshrined in the ECHR. 
In sum, the author aims to provide a legal analysis of a key legal aspect of migrating child brides, as 
specified in the research question. 
 
1.3. Limitations 
 
Child marriage is a serious and widespread problem. A lot needs to be done to end the practice 
completely and it is therefore a topic worth studying from many aspects, but this thesis will consider 
the issue of the migrating, married children only. It is also understood that child marriage affects 
several human rights of the victims. However, this thesis will be limited to the rights affected directly 
in child marriages in the context of migration only with a focus on the prohibition of slavery and the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, giving more weight to the latter, and the right to respect for 
private and family life, with focus on family life only. 
 
It is also recognized that in addition to adolescent girls, child marriage affects young boys as well. 
Boys should be entitled to the same protection and rights as girls, but because it is generally accepted 
that child marriage is a form of gender-based violence as it disproportionately affects young women 
and girls13 and because child marriage is regulated in several international instruments concerning 
the rights of women, this thesis will be limited to the so-called child brides only and only to the 
marriages that have been concluded according to the laws of the concluding State and should thus be 
                                                
13 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, UNGA 
A/HRC/31/57 (2016) para. 58. 
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enforced abroad as well.14 Nevertheless, whenever this thesis addresses the issues arising from family 
reunification applications where the child bride seeks asylum or a residence permit on family 
reunification grounds, the focus will be put only on the child brides residing outside European borders 
at the time the application is lodged. The possible violations on the rights of the husband, or the 
interests of any children born within the marriage are not discussed in this thesis.  
 
This thesis provides a brief overview of the international legal framework concerning child marriage 
but is this further limited to Member States of the EU only and to the ECHR as the main Convention.  
 
1.4. Sources 
 
As a doctrinal study, the main sources of this thesis will be legal doctrines and case law. While the 
focus is in the EU, the main sources throughout the study are the ECHR and case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Even if court decisions are only secondary sources of international 
law and do not have a binding effect,15 they are a significant source in this thesis while the recognition 
of foreign child marriages is not explicitly regulated in any international instruments. Therefore, the 
analysis this thesis contains will mostly be based on case law of the ECtHR as well as on national 
case law. Furthermore, legal literature, other research and soft law relating to the issue of this study 
are also used to support the analysis of the ECHR and case law.  
 
As all EU Member States are also members of the Council of Europe, resolutions by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe concerning child marriage will as well be addressed for presenting 
the viewpoint of the Council of Europe on child marriages. Even if the resolutions are not binding on 
Member States, they do have a significant political and moral effect and can thus be regarded as 
important tools for analysing the extent of obligations EU States have towards the recognition of 
foreign child marriages. Moreover, some national legislation of EU States will as well be analysed 
and compared with each other for achieving an understanding on how EU States have addressed the 
issue of the migrating child brides within their State borders. 
 
                                                
14 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women/Committee on the Rights of the Child ‘Joint 
General Comment No 31 of the CEDAW / No 18 of the CRC on harmful practices’ (2014) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/31-
CRC/C/GC/18, para. 3-4, see also Murphy, Kent, ‘The Traditional View of Public Policy and Ordre Public in Private 
International law’, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1981) p. 591. 
15 The Statue of the International Court of Justice (1945) Art. 38d, see also Art. 59. 
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In the ECHR, the two main articles discussed as the conflicting norms in the context of migrating 
child brides will be the prohibition of torture (Article 3) and the right to respect for private and family 
life (Article 8). The prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4) will as well briefly be 
analysed in conjunction with peremptory norms of international law, which in turn will be analysed 
with the help of the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles).  
 
Even if the focus is in the EU, with the aim of presenting the international legal framework addressing 
child marriage, multiple UN instruments, resolutions and recommendations prohibiting or 
condemning the practice will briefly be discussed and later used throughout the study to fill in the 
gaps, or to support EU legislation. Among the UN conventions, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) are the most relevant conventions in the context of child marriages and especially 
the general comments and recommendations by the CEDAW Committee, the CAT Committee and 
by the CRC Committee are important sources in defining a child marriage and in analysing  the legal 
effect of such marriage. 
 
Furthermore, several internet sources including news articles and statistics by UNICEF and the UN 
Population Fund will as well be used to demonstrate the scope of the issue of this study and to discuss 
child marriage in general. 
 
2. Child Brides Crossing into Europe – Causes, Responses and Obligations 
2.1. Child Marriage in General – Causes and Consequences 
 
A child marriage is defined as “marriage where at least one of the parties is under 18 years of age”16 
and most commonly, it is a union between an adolescent girl and an older man.17 A child marriage 
can be based on consent of the child bride, but it is often arranged by the family of the girl against 
her will for exchange of dowries, for protection for the girl and the family against violence and sexual 
                                                
16 Joint General Comment No 31 of the CEDAW / No 18 of the CRC on harmful practices (2014) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, para. 20. 
17 Global Citizen, ‘Child Marriage: What you need to know and how you can help end it’, by Daniele Selby and Carmen 
Singer, 2019, available from: https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/child-marriage-brides-india-niger-syria/ 
(20.4.2020). 
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harassment by third-parties or simply because of culture and traditions.18 For example in Turkey, 
almost half of all child marriages are concluded because of a decision made by the child brides’ 
family.19 While the child brides have often not expressed their consent to the marriage, or because of 
their young age cannot be seen as capable of giving “a full, free and informed consent”,20 child 
marriages are regarded as one type of forced marriage.21   
 
Nevertheless, even if consent has been given, the young brides may not fully understand the nature 
and impact of the union, or may not have the courage to refuse or question the authority of their 
family.22 Therefore, young girls are particularly vulnerable for the harmful consequences of a child 
marriage and even a consent to the union by a child bride may be questionable.23 Although there are 
arguments that all child marriages are inherently forced marriages while children cannot validly 
consent,24 international instruments and national legislation of many States provide exceptions to the 
marriageable age of 1825 and it can therefore be argued that some children may be mature enough for 
an informed consent. Consequently, all marriages categorized as child marriages are necessarily not 
forced marriages. However, a consent to the marriage does not exclude the fact that the union may 
be harmful for the child.26  
 
There are several reasons for child marriage but above all, it is deeply rooted in traditional gender-
roles where women and girls are seen as being less valuable than men and boys.27 Child marriage 
evolves from inequality between men and women and is often a consequence of poverty and 
desperation. Many parents in poor areas believe that marriage can safeguard their daughter’s future 
while the parents have not the capacity to take care of their children by themselves. They transfer the 
responsibility to others; older men who are assumed to take care of the adolescent girls. Consequently, 
                                                
18 European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘Child marriage: Still too many’, PE 623.526-June 2018. pp.1-2, see also 
El-Arab (2018), pp. 5-6. 
19 Council of Europe, GREVIO, Baseline Evaluation Report: Turkey, Strasbourg 2018, para. 237. 
20 Joint General Comment No 31 of the CEDAW / No 18 of the CRC on harmful practices (2014) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, para. 20. 
21 The illegality of forced marriages will be discussed further in the next sub-chapter. See also UN Human Rights Office 
of the High Commissioner, ‘Child, early and forced marriage, including in humanitarian settings’, available from: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/women/wrgs/pages/childmarriage.aspx (25.3.2020). 
22 Turner, Catherine, ‘Out of the Shadows – Child marriage and slavery’, Anti-Slavery International, April 2013, p. 17. 
23 GREVIO, Baseline Evaluation Report: Turkey 2018, para. 238, see also Turner (2013) p. 17. 
24 See for example Actionaid: ‘Child Marriage’, available from: https://www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us/what-we-
do/violence-against-women-and-girls/child-marriage (23.4.2020). 
25 See chapter 2.2. 
26 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner ‘Child, early and forced marriage, including in humanitarian 
settings’, available from: https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/women/wrgs/pages/childmarriage.aspx (25.3.2020). 
27 Joint General Comment No 31 of the CEDAW / No 18 of the CRC on harmful practices’ (2014) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, para. 6. 
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child marriage is strongly affected by culture, religion and false believes on the best interests of the 
children making it a difficult issue to eliminate.28 In many regions of the world, it is a practice 
governed not only by national law, but also by religious laws and practices discriminating women 
and girls.29  
 
A great amount of effort and progress has been made to combat the practice but nevertheless, child 
marriage rates are decreasing slowly. Because of the population growth in the developing countries, 
the total number of child marriages will actually be expected to grow instead of the targeted decrease. 
A lot of international, regional and national instruments concerning child marriage already exists, but 
because of the scope and complexity of the issue, a lot more needs to be done.30 According to the 
Sustainable Development Goals by the UN, child marriage shall be ended by year 203031 and most 
importantly, the victims of child marriage must be supported and protected; children who are in risk 
of ending up married under the age of 18 and the ones who already have been victimized.32  
 
Child marriage is a widespread problem that touches every region of the world in one way or another33 
and affects tens of millions of children each year.34  It is considered as a fundamental human rights 
violation that violates the children’s right to choose who to marry,35 exposes them to both physical 
and psychological violence36 and endangers the lives and health of them through early pregnancy and 
sexually transmitting diseases like HIV. Because young girls are often not ready for pregnancy, 
complications leading to death during pregnancy or childbirth are the most common causes of death 
among young girls in developing countries.37 Child marriage affects also fundamentally to the futures 
                                                
28 United Nations Population Fund, topics – ‘Child marriage’, available from: https://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage 
(8.11.2019). 
29 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘General recommendation on Article 16 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women’, CEDAW/C/GC/29, February 2013, para. 
2. 
30 United Nations Population Fund, topics – ‘Child marriage’, available from: https://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage 
(8.11.2019). 
31 UN Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform, ‘Sustainable Development Goal 5: Achieve gender equality 
and empower all women and girls’, available from: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg5 (9.11.2019). 
32 United Nations Population Fund, topics – ‘Child marriage’. available from: https://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage 
(8.11.2019). 
33 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, UNGA 
A/HRC/31/57 (2016) para. 63. 
34 UNFPA’s Action for Adolescent Girls, ‘Building the health, social and economic assets of adolescent girls, especially 
those at risk of child marriage’, Programme Document, 2014, p. 3. 
35 United Nations Population Fund, topics – ‘Child marriage’, available from: https://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage 
(8.11.2019) . 
36 Joint General Comment No 31 of the CEDAW / No 18 of the CRC on harmful practices (2014) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, para. 22. 
37 United Nations Population Fund, topics – ‘Child marriage’. Available from: https://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage 
(8.11.2019). 
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of the children; while the decision-making capacities of the young girls is often very limited, their 
freedom of movement is generally restricted and their right to education denied. Girls drop out of 
school and start taking care of their households at a very young age which affects both the social and 
the intellectual development of the child.38 Therefore, even if child marriage is often a consequence 
of poverty and inequality, it also keeps producing it.39  
The severe and gross nature of child marriage is also reflected in the fact that child marriage may 
amount to a breach of two fundamental principles of customary international law; the prohibition of 
torture and the prohibition of slavery.40 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has held that 
“women and girls in situations of child and forced marriage may experience conditions inside a 
marriage which meet “international legal definitions of slavery and slavery-like practices””.41 
Furthermore, Anti-Slavery International likens child marriage to slavery in situations where the girl 
is abducted as a wife or in situations where the child’s parents hand over the child as a wife for gaining 
protection for the family.42 When the husband exercises full control over the child and an informed 
and full consent does not exist, the relationship of the child bride and the husband may constitute as 
“ownership” rather than a marital union and thus amount to slavery.43 Child marriage is also 
addressed in the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery where child marriage is categorized as an institution or 
practice “similar to slavery”.44  
When it comes to torture and ill-treatment, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment Juan Mendez has identified child marriage 
as a form of torture and ill-treatment while such marriages are “strongly linked to violence against 
women and inflict long-term physical and psychological harm on victims.”45 Moreover, the UN 
                                                
38 Joint General Comment No 31 of the CEDAW / No 18 of the CRC on harmful practices (2014) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, para. 22. 
39 United Nations Population Fund, topics – ‘Child marriage’, available from: https://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage 
(8.11.2019). 
40 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ’Preventing and eliminating child, 
early and forced marriage’, Human Rights Council, Twenty-sixth session, Agenda items 2 and 3, A/HRC/26/22, April 
2014, para. 24, see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, UNGA A/HRC/31/57 (2016) para. 58. 
41 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ’Preventing and eliminating child, 
early and forced marriage’, Human Rights Council, Twenty-sixth session, Agenda items 2 and 3, A/HRC/26/22, April 
2014, para. 21. 
42 Turner (2013) p. 16. 
43 Ibid., p. 17. 
44 the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar 
to Slavery, Art. 1.C, see also Chapter 2.2. 
45 UNGA A/HRC/31/57 (2016) para. 63. 
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Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) have held 
that child marriage is “a harmful practice which leads to the infliction of physical, mental or sexual 
harm or suffering, with both short-and long-term consequences, and negatively impacts on the 
capacity of victims to realize the full range of their rights” and may thus constitute torture or ill-
treatment.46 Accordingly, a child marriage may lead to a breach of an internationally recognized 
peremptory norm.47 
This thesis will next briefly discuss the international legal framework protecting against child 
marriage and then continue with the focus on the migrating child brides. 
 
2.2. International Legal Framework Concerning Child Marriage 
 
Child marriage is prohibited either directly, or indirectly in multiple international legal instruments. 
Already the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) listed the right to marry as a 
fundamental right to which all adults are entitled to. The Declaration says that “men and women of 
full age...have the right to marry and found a family” and promotes the importance of consent in 
marriage.48  The marital rights protected in the Declaration were later elaborated in the UN 
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages,49 
which imposes an obligation on State Parties to take all appropriate measures for eliminating both 
forced marriage and child marriage completely.50 It obliges all State Parties to set a minimum age of 
marriage in their legislation and to ensure that all marriages under this age have no legal effect except 
in special circumstances where the marriage is in the best interest of both parties.51 The Convention 
came into force in 1964 and is ratified by 56 States from which 24 are European.52 
Today, the most important international treaties in the context of child marriage are the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)53 and the UN 
                                                
46 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Twenty-Sixth Session, Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Preventing and eliminating child, early and forced marriage, A/HRC/26/22, para. 10. 
47 See chapter 3.1. 
48 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in December 1948, Art. 16. 
49 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, opened for signature 
and ratification by General Assembly in November 1962, entry into force in December 1964. 
50 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, preamble. 
51 Ibid., Art. 2. 
52 United Nations Treaty Collections, ‘Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration 
of Marriages’, status as at: 15-12-2019, available from: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVI-3&chapter=16&lang=en (15.12.2019). 
53 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted by General Assembly in 
December 1979, entry into force in September 1981. 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).54 The CEDAW, the Convention promoting the equal 
rights of men and women55 expressly prohibits child marriage in Article 16. The Article imposes a 
positive obligation on State Parties to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations.”56 Even if the Article deals 
with the marital rights of women in general, its second paragraph prohibits child marriage completely 
by stating that “the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect.”57 CEDAW does not provide age 
limits for a child marriage, but the CRC defines children as humans “below the age of eighteen 
years.”58 The CEDAW Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) 
have also issued a joint general comment on harmful practices59 where the committees describe child 
marriage as marriage “where at least one of the parties is under 18 years of age.”60 Accordingly, it 
can be argued that a marriage that shall have no legal effect according to the CEDAW is a marriage 
concluded before the age of 18. 
The CRC does not explicitly discuss the issue of child marriage, but the CRC Committee recommends 
State parties to set a minimum age of marriage to 18 years of age.61 The CRC Committee has also 
recognized that Article 24(3) of the CRC imposing an obligation on States to “take all effective and 
appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of 
children” should be applicable on child marriage.62 The CRC also imposes an obligation on parents 
to make decisions concerning their children taking into consideration the best interests of their child.63 
The best interests standard is a fundamental principle of international law that should guide the 
decisions of all authorities, States, as well as parents in decisions concerning children. It can be argued 
that in situations where parents marry off their daughters for the exchange of dowries, the best 
                                                
54 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by General Assembly in November 1989, entry into force in September 
1990. 
55 CEDAW, preamble. 
56 Ibid., Art. 16.1. 
57 Ibid., Art. 16.2. 
58 CRC, Art. 1. 
59 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women/Committee on the Rights of the Child ‘Joint 
General Comment No 31 of the CEDAW / No 18 of the CRC on harmful practices’ (2014) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/31-
CRC/C/GC/18, para. 20. 
60 ‘Joint General Comment No 31 of the CEDAW / No 18 of the CRC on harmful practices’ (2014) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, para. 20. 
61 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 4 (2003): Adolescent Health and Development 
in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1 July 2003, CRC/GC/2003/4, para. 5. 
62 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ’Preventing and eliminating child, 
early and forced marriage’, Human Rights Council, Twenty-sixth session, Agenda items 2 and 3, A/HRC/26/22, April 
2014, para. 10. 
63 CRC, Art. 18. 
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interests of the child may not be the primary consideration. Nevertheless, the standard of the best 
interests of a child will be discussed further in chapter 4. 
Additional interesting instruments in the context of child marriage are the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)64 and the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery (Slavery Convention).65  As this thesis already argued, child marriage is 
acknowledged, at least in certain situations as a form of torture or ill-treatment or may constitute 
slavery.66 Accordingly, it can be argued that child marriage may fall within the scope of the two 
particular Conventions.67 The CAT does not explicitly refer to child marriages but it obliges all State 
Parties to “take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of 
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction”68 and to “ensure that all acts of torture are offences 
under its criminal law”69 and  thus suggests that all States should criminalize child marriages that 
constitute torture or ill-treatment in their national legislation. The Slavery Convention urges Member 
States to abolish practices where “a woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in 
marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any 
other person or group.”70 While child marriages are often arranged by families for the exchange of 
dowries,71 and while Article 2 of the Convention obliges States to set “suitable minimum ages of 
marriage”,72 it can be argued that the Slavery Convention likens child marriage to an institution 
“similar to slavery.”73 
 
Even if many States continue having laws discriminating women and girls and justify child marriages 
in light of religious laws and cultural practices,74 it can arguably be said that child marriage is 
prohibited in international law which imposes both positive and negative obligations on States to 
ensure the elimination of the practice. The importance of abolishing child marriage has also been 
                                                
64 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General 
Assembly in December 1984, entry into force in June 1987. 
65 The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices similar to 
Slavery, adopted by Economic and Social Council in September 1956, entry into force in April 1957. 
66 See chapter 2.1. 
67 See chapter 2.1. 
68 CAT, Art. 2.1. 
69 CAT, Art. 4. 
70 Ibid., Art. 1C. 
71 UNFPA: ‘Child Marriage’, Available from: https://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage (30.03.2020). 
72 The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices similar to 
Slavery., Art. 2. 
73 Ibid., Section 1. 
74 CEDAW General Recommendation on article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/29 (2013) para. 10. 
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recognized in Europe and hence, in European legislation. The most important articles in the ECHR 
in the context of child marriage are Article 3 prohibiting torture75 and Article 12 which protects the 
right to marry of all “men and women of marriageable age…according to national laws”76 which, 
according to the multiple international instruments and recommendations should be set to the age of 
18.77 Article 8 of the Convention protects the “right to respect for private and family life” and does 
not explicitly prohibit child marriage, but for a marriage to fall within the scope of the Article, the 
marriage must either be a legal marriage or must constitute a de facto relationship.78  
 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has also expressed its concerns of child 
marriage by noting that “the Parliamentary Assembly is deeply concerned about the serious and 
recurrent violations of human rights and the rights of the child, which are constituted by forced 
marriages and child marriages.”79 Even if the resolutions by the Assembly are not binding,80 they do 
have a significant “moral and political impact.”81 The Assembly recommends States to ratify all the 
important international instruments in the context of child marriage and urges States to “set a 
minimum age of marriage for both women and men to 18” in their legislation.82 Later in 2018, in a 
resolution concerning forced marriage, the Assembly recognized child marriage as a type of forced 
marriage due to the fact that a child rarely can express her consent to marriage83 and urges State 
Parties to criminalize all forms of forced marriage.84 As child marriage can often be likened to forced 
marriage, the practice is also prohibited in the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, the so-called ‘Istanbul Convention’, 
which affords protection to all child victims of violence covered in the Convention85 and urges States 
to take all necessary steps to criminalize forced marriage of both adults and children.86 
 
                                                
75 The European Convention on Human Rights, entry into force in September 1953, Art. 3. 
76 ECHR, Art. 12. 
77 CRC/GC/2003/4 (2003) para. 5. 
78 ECHR, Art. 8, European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Right to Respect for private and family life, home and correspondence’, Council of Europe, 2019, p. 56, para. 258, see 
also chapter 3.4. 
79 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘Forced marriages and child marriages’, Resolution 1468 
(2005), para. 1. 
80 Schwebel, Stephen M., ’The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N General Assembly on Customary International Law’, 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) Vol. 73 (April 26-28, 1979), Cambridge 
University Press, p. 301. 
81 Ibid., p. 305. 
82 Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1468 (2005) para. 13-14. 
83 Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2233 (2018) para. 3. 
84 Ibid., para. 7.5. 
85 Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, 
‘Istanbul Convention’, Istanbul 2011, Art. 26. 
86 Istanbul Convention, Art. 37. 
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All in all, child marriage should not be tolerated in any legal framework. It is prohibited in several 
international and regional legal instruments and should be prohibited in all national legislation as 
well. The prohibition of child marriage in general seems to be an undisputed issue in Europe because 
in fact there are only a few States who have not regulated a minimum age for marriage in their 
legislation.87 Nevertheless, only a few States within the EU have fixed an absolute minimum age for 
marriage to the age of 18; many States have exceptions to this rule. Most EU States allow marriage 
under the age of 18 with the consent of parents or/and public authorities88 as acknowledged in several 
international instruments. The joint general comment of CEDAW Committee and CRC Committee 
states:  
 
A marriage of a mature, capable child below 18 years of age may be allowed in 
exceptional circumstances, provided that the child is at least 16 years of age and that such 
decisions are made by a judge based on legitimate exceptional grounds defined by law 
and on the evidence of maturity, without defence to culture and tradition.89  
 
Moreover, the UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration 
of Marriages allows exceptions to the rule of minimum age of 18 “where competent authority has 
granted a dispensation as to age, for serious reasons, in the interests of the intending spouses.”90 So, 
the exceptions should be based exclusively on the maturity of the child, not on defence of culture or 
tradition and the marriage must be in the best interests of the spouses.91 The joint general comment 
of the CEDAW Committee and the CRC Committee also suggests that marriages concluded under 
the age of 16 are never allowed.  
 
On the other hand, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe urges member States to set 
18 years as the absolute minimum age for marriage and stresses out that persons under the age of 18 
would thus not be able to get married lawfully.92 As for now, only Denmark, Germany, the 
                                                
87 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: ‘Marriage with consent of a public authority and/or public figure’. 
Available from: https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/mapping-minimum-age-requirements/marriage-age 
(12.11.2019). 
88 Ibid. 
89 ‘Joint General Comment No 31 of the CEDAW / No 18 of the CRC on harmful practices’ (2014) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, para. 20. 
90 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, Art. 2. 
91 See chapter 4.6. 
92 Assembly Resolution 1468 (2005), para, 14.2.1 and para. 12. 
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Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland and since 2019 also Finland have regulated an absolute minimum age 
for marriage as recommended by the Parliamentary Assembly.93 
 
Furthermore, during the ongoing migration situation in the EU, a new issue in the context of child 
marriage has emerged; as an estimated 700 million young girls around the world are married before 
the age of 1894 and many of the child marriages are concluded during humanitarian crises within 
refugee camps, many girls migrating to Europe are married. While the prohibition of child marriage 
under international law seems uncontested, the flow of migrants to Europe have brought up the issue 
of the extent of State obligations with respect to the recognition of child marriages concluded outside 
the EU.  
 
2.3. Child Marriage in the Context of Migration 
 
In 2015, EU encountered a significant increase in migration flows.95 The ongoing refugee-crises has 
brought millions of asylum seekers and migrants across European borders and because of the endless 
crises situations, the movement of persons around the world is not at least expected to decrease.96 
Regardless of the so-called refugee-crises, most migrants are moving across State borders because of 
the constantly globalizing world, not because of unsafe conditions in their home countries.97 
However, unfortunately, many of them arrive from conflict zones and harsh conditions and are in an 
urgent need of international protection.  
The ongoing humanitarian crises and war in the Middle East has not only lead to an increase in the 
migration flows, but it has also raised significantly the number of child marriages. It is generally 
recognized that in conflict zones and within refugee camps, child marriages, as well as forced 
marriages increases for multiple reasons.98 Since 2015, the practice has been common in the Middle 
East99 and for example in Syria, child marriage rates of Syrian children have increased from 15 
                                                
93 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: ‘Marriage with consent of a public authority and/or public figure’, 
available from: https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/mapping-minimum-age-requirements/marriage-age 
(12.11.2019). 
94 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on his 
mission to Brazil, UNGA A/HRC/31/57 (2016) para. 63. 
95 European Parliament: ‘Asylum and Migration in the EU: facts and figures, July 2019. Available from: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/asylum-and-migration-in-the-eu-facts-
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96 Chetail, Vincent, International Migration Law, Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 2. 
97 Ibid., p. 3. 
98 GREVIO, Turkey, 2018, para 239. 
99 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on his 
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percent to 36 percent during war even if child marriage in the contemporary Arab region is not a 
common practice.100  
Child marriage during conflict is common for many reasons but most commonly, girl children get 
married in conflict zones and refugee camps because of the need of protection against sexual 
harassment and violence committed by unknown men and because of economic needs.101 As 
elsewhere child marriage is usually carried out because of inequality, economic needs as well as 
culture and tradition, during conflict families marry off their daughters because they tend to think that 
if their girls get married at young age, their families are more protected and because marriage is seen 
as an opportunity to escape poverty after conflict.102 Child marriage may also occur during conflict 
for ensuring documents for migration and is thus seen as a possibility to escape conflict areas.103  
Since 2015, millions of refugees have migrated to Europe, most of them from Syria. The Syrian child 
brides cross into Europe in hope of a new life and a refugee status, but the European States have faced 
difficulties in the determination of the legal status of the child bride; children travelling without their 
parents would be entitled to an unaccompanied minor status and thus enjoy special protection, but 
because they are married, they are not eligible for such status.104 The child brides could also seek 
asylum or a residence permit for family reunification purposes in case their husband already has a 
permanent residence in an EU State,105 but because the young brides are children, their marriage 
should not be valid. Eventually, the non-recognition of a child marriage leads to several other 
dilemmas concerning the enjoyment of other human rights, for example the child brides’ right to 
family life. This dilemma has lead to the point where EU States have been forced to re-examine their 
legislation in the context of child marriage.106 A lot of efforts have already been made for combatting 
child marriage in States where the practice is common, but the European States have certainly not 
been prepared to combat the problem within their State borders. 
                                                
100 Aljazeera: ‘Married at 14: Syria’s Refugee Child Brides’, June 2018, available from: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/inthefield/2018/06/married-14-syria-refugee-child-brides-
180630102118158.html (15.11.2019) , See also El Arab (2018) p. 1. 
101 El Arab (2018) pp. 5-6. 
102 El Arab (2018) p. 1, Aljazeera: ‘Married at 14: Syria’s Refugee Child Brides’, June 2018, available from: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/inthefield/2018/06/married-14-syria-refugee-child-brides-
180630102118158.html (15.11.2019), UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, para. 23. 
103 UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, para. 23. 
104 The European Commission, ‘Approaches to Unaccompanied Minors Following Status Determination in the EU plus 
Norway, Synthesis Report for the EMN Study, July 2018, pp. 5-6. 
105 The European Commission, ‘Migration and Home Affairs: Family Reunification’, available from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/family-reunification_en (30.03.2020). 
106 Reuters: ’Child bride refugees spur Sweden to tighten marriage law’, October 2018, available from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-childmarriage-law/child-bride-refugees-spur-sweden-to-tighten-marriage-
law-idUSKCN1MY01J (15.11.2019). 
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2.4. Applicability of the ECHR to Child Brides 
 
When migrants from outside the EU arrive to an EU State, they may seek protection from the country 
they arrive to and thus become asylum seekers.107 During their asylum-process, they, like all human 
beings, are protected by international human rights law while all UN Member States have committed 
themselves to “protecting the safety, dignity and human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 
migrants, regardless of their migratory status, at all times.”108 Within EU borders, migrants are also 
protected under the ECHR which obliges all State Parties to “secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” in the Convention.109 The jurisdiction of the ECHR is primarily 
territorial.110 However, during a family reunification application, the child bride is most likely yet 
outside the boundaries of EU and the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR must be assessed. 
The ECtHR has recognized two circumstances in which jurisdiction of States may be extended 
beyond State borders. Firstly, in Loizidou v. Turkey, the Court held that State Parties may be 
responsible of “acts and omissions of their authorities which produce effects outside their own 
territory”111 such as in situations where a State “exercises effective control of an area outside its 
national territory”112 and secondly, in Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom the ECHR held 
that: 
Whenever a State, through its agents, exercises control and authority over an individual, 
and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that 
individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to 
the situation of that individual.113  
The Court thus suggests that the ECHR can be applied abroad when “executive and judicial 
functions” are applied by authorities beyond the States’ borders.114 In Kuric and others v. Slovenia 
the Court found that the ECHR is applicable to legislative measures directly affecting persons living 
                                                
107 European Parliament: ‘Asylum and Migration in the EU: facts and figures, July 2019, available from: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/asylum-and-migration-in-the-eu-facts-
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108 Chetail (2019), pp. 68-70, orig. statement UNGA Res 71/1 (19 September 2016) para 5 and 41. 
109 ECHR, Art. 1. 
110 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 2019, para. 
2. 
111 Loizidou v. Turkey, app. no. 15318/89 (ECtHR 23/03/1995) para. 52. 
112 Loizidou, para. 52. 
113 Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 55721/07, (ECtHR 07/07/2011) para. 137. 
114 ECHR: ‘Guide on Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Obligation to respect human rights – 
Concepts of “jurisdiction” and imputability’, 2019, para. 34. 
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abroad115 whereas in Haydarie v. the Netherlands, where an Afghan mother living in the Netherlands 
requested a “provisional residence visa” for family reunification purposes for her three children living 
currently in Pakistan, the Court found that because of the ongoing asylum process and the family life 
at stake, the three children in Pakistan should fall within the jurisdiction of Netherlands like their 
mother does.116 
In situations where a child bride requests asylum or a residence permit for family reunification 
purposes while her husband already has a permanent residence in an EU State, the child bride most 
likely is yet outside the boundaries of the EU. However, based on ECtHR case law, a family 
reunification application would bring the child bride within the jurisdiction of the ECHR while there 
is family life at stake and the receiving State exercises “executive and judicial functions” beyond its 
State borders during the process.117 Therefore, when discussing the human rights of the child brides 
in this study, the Convention that will be applied on the children will be the ECHR regardless of the 
State where they reside at the time their family reunification application is lodged. 
 
2.5. European Responses to the Issue of the Migrating Child Brides 
 
The current situation of the migrating child brides has awakened EU States into discussions of 
whether child marriages concluded abroad should be recognized within third-State borders or not. 
There are currently thousands of child brides living in Europe118 and therefore, both EU policy 
makers, as well as EU States have been forced to respond to the situation. This has led to an increase 
in initiatives and new laws concerning child marriage in Europe.  
 
Already in 2003, before the significant increase in the refugee flows to Europe, EU issued a Directive 
on the Right to Family Reunification which establishes rules for determining the conditions under 
which the right to family reunification shall be exercised in EU. During the past two decades, family 
reunification has been one of the most common reasons for migration to Europe.119 As the right to 
family reunification is an entry channel to an EU State for third-state nationals whose family members 
                                                
115  Heijer (2012) p. 48. 
116 Haydarie v. the Netherlands, decision as to the admissibility of app.no. 8876/04 (ECtHR 20/10/2005), Council of 
Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 20 October 2005. 
117 ECHR: ‘Guide on Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Obligation to respect human rights – 
Concepts of “jurisdiction” and imputability’, 2019, para. 34. 
118 Plan International: ‘Child marriages creeping into Europe’, available from: https://www.plan.ie/stories/child-marriage-
europe/ (17.11.2019). 
119 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, ‘Family reunification’, available from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/family-reunification_en (17.11.2019). 
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are already legally residing within the EU,120 the right can be misused as an access to Europe. Family 
reunification may therefore be a motive for concluding child marriages abroad within conflict zones 
or during the journey to Europe. The Family Reunification Directive is supposed to hamper the 
misuse of the right121 by authorizing EU Member States to fix a minimum age for marriage accepted 
for family reunification.122 Most Member States have taken advantage of the power granted to them 
in the Directive by regulating minimum age limits for family reunification and five States have fixed 
the age limit to the highest possible the Directive offers, 21 years.123  
 
In addition to the restrictions to the right to family reunification imposed by most EU Member States, 
some States have during the recent years began to ban the recognition of child marriages concluded 
abroad entirely within their State borders. Already in 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe recommended that child marriages concluded abroad should not be recognized 
within its Member States “except where recognition would be in the victims’ best interest.”124 
Netherlands was the first EU State banning child marriage completely in 2015, when they adopted a 
new legislation for the prevention of forced marriage and child marriage; the Forced Marriage 
Prevention Act. The Act not only set an absolute minimum age of marriage in Netherlands to the age 
of 18, but it also put an entire ban on the recognition of child marriages concluded abroad. According 
to the Act, no marriage concluded abroad at the time either of the spouses was a minor will be 
recognized in Netherlands until both partners have reached the age of 18.125  
 
In 2017, new laws for combatting child marriage went into effect both in Germany and in Denmark.126 
Both of the laws set an absolute minimum age for marriage to 18 and in Germany, it also nullifies all 
marriages that were concluded before either of the spouses had reached the age of 16 and gives 
domestic courts the power to annul marriages where either of the partners was under the age of 18 at 
the time the marriage was concluded.127 In Denmark, marriages concluded abroad before the age of 
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18 will not be recognized except if the “married couple can provide a ‘compelling argument’ for their 
marriage.”128 The aim of these laws is to combat child marriages concluded mainly abroad and the 
protection of the victims of child marriage. In Germany, authorities are granted the power to take 
minor, married girls into State custody and separate them from their older husbands if necessary.129 
Later in 2019, a new law banning the recognition of all child marriages concluded abroad went into 
effect in Sweden as well.130  
In 2019, Finland changed the legislation in the context of child marriage by removing the possibility 
of marriage under the age of 18 with the consent of public authorities and fixed an absolute minimum 
age for marriage to 18.131 However, the initiative did not propose any changes to the current policy 
of recognition of child marriages concluded abroad in Finland, but the issue was discussed during the 
drafting process. A child marriage concluded abroad is in principle legal in Finland, but authorities 
have been given a wide discretion in assessing the best interests of the child in each case individually. 
According to the current legal framework in Finland, a marriage concluded abroad shall not be 
recognized if it is against the Finnish public policy132 and therefore, child marriages concluded abroad 
are rarely recognized in Finland. There was seen no need to amend the legislation in the context of 
the recognition of marriages concluded abroad because the current national legal framework in 
Finland allows the possibility that all marriages concluded abroad will in future also be evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the best interests of the child.133 While the current 
Finnish legislation does no longer allow exceptions to the marriageable age of 18, underage marriages 
concluded abroad are even more often against the Finnish public policy and therefore, the practice in 
Finland with regard foreign child marriages appears similar to the practices in States that have banned 
entirely the recognition of such marriages in their legislation.134 Nevertheless, after the new law was 
put into effect, the Finnish minister of justice of the time, Antti Häkkänen, expressed his concerns of 
child marriages concluded abroad and proclaimed that the next step will be the assessment of the 
recognition of marriages concluded abroad as minors. According to Häkkänen, a complete ban on 
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child marriages would give an international signal that Finland does not approve child marriage and 
would as well promote the rights of women.135  
 
The recognition, or the non-recognition of child marriages concluded abroad is a debated issue in 
Europe. The restricting of the right to family reunification has been seen by the European Parliament 
as a violation of the right to respect for family life and of the prohibition of discrimination and the 
European Court of Justice has therefore held that the restrictions must be applied in a manner 
consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms protected in the ECHR.136 All States that have 
completely banned child marriage within their State borders have ended up as subjects of a heated 
debate on the non-recognition of child marriage concluded abroad and the legal dilemmas arising 
from the ban. The non-recognition of child marriages will be balanced later in this paper with the 
conflicting norms, but first it is appropriate to analyse the international instruments addressing the 
extent of obligations EU States have regarding the recognition of foreign child marriages. 
 
2.6. Is there an Obligation of Non-Recognition in International Instruments? 
 
As discussed, a few EU States have imposed a total ban on the recognition of child marriages 
concluded abroad and thus ended up as subjects of debate on whether they are conforming their 
international obligations or not and whether a total ban on child marriage is compatible with other 
human rights norms. The non-recognition of foreign child marriages is not very much addressed in 
international instruments, but a few exceptions exist. 
CEDAW, one of the most important instruments in the context of child marriage not only obliges 
States to set a minimum age for marriage in their legislation, but its Article 16 also states that 
“marriage of a child shall have no legal effect”137 which could be understood as an obligation of non-
recognition of child marriages, namely marriages concluded “below the age of eighteen years.”138 
Even if the prohibition seems very strict and straightforward, the CEDAW Committee has not issued 
any general comments or interpretations on the matter. However, CEDAW has proclaimed that 
reservations on Article 16 are not compatible with the principles set forth in the Convention and the 
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Article should therefore be binding on all Member States.139 Even if the wording of the Article is very 
absolute and does not give any possibilities for exceptions, the joint general comment of CEDAW 
and CRC mitigates the impact of the absolute wording of Article 16 by providing exceptions to the 
marriageable age of 18.140 So even if there seems to be an absolute obligation of non-recognition of 
child marriages in the CEDAW, the Convention allows exceptions to marriageable age and should 
therefore not be understood in its actual wording. However, exceptions should be based exclusively 
on the maturity of the child, not on defence of culture or tradition. 
Whereas the CEDAW expressly prohibits child marriages and apart from exceptional situations 
obliges State Parties not to give any legal effect to such marriages, the Istanbul Convention addresses 
the issue of forced marriage by stating in Article 32 that “parties shall take the necessary legislative 
or other measures to ensure that marriages concluded under force may be voidable, annulled or 
dissolved without undue financial or administrative burden placed on the victim”141 and by imposing 
an obligation on State parties to “take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the 
intentional conduct of forcing an adult or a child to enter into a marriage is criminalised.”142 While 
child marriage is recognized as a form of forced marriage, these particular articles should prevail in 
situations where a child is forcibly married off to her husband. With respect to Article 32, the 
explanatory report of the Convention defines an “annulled” marriage as a marriage that is “deprived 
of its legal consequences, whether challenged by a party or not”143 and thus suggests that a forced 
marriage can be left unrecognized even if the child bride did not request for non-recognition. 
However, the report also indicates that the annulment of a forced marriage “should not affect the 
rights of the victim of forced marriage”144 and thus indicates that all forced marriages should be 
considered individually taking into consideration the other rights of the victim as well.145 
Nevertheless, Article 37 obliges State parties to criminalise forced marriage but does not speak out 
on the matter of forced marriages already concluded abroad and the recognition of such marriages.146 
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All in all, there are two international instruments imposing obligations on State Parties on the non-
recognition of child marriages to some extent. However, after reading the interpretations of the strict 
and absolute articles in question, they all allow exceptions to situations and therefore, it cannot be 
argued that according to these two Conventions, an absolute obligation of non-recognition exists.  
Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution from 2005 is very 
strict and clear regarding child marriages. In addition to urging States to set an absolute minimum 
age for marriage,147 it also urges States to: 
 
Refrain from recognizing forced marriages and child marriages contracted abroad except 
where recognition would be in the victims’ best interests with regard to the effects of the 
marriage, particularly for the purpose of securing rights which they could not claim 
otherwise.148  
 
Later in 2018, in its “forced marriage” Resolution, the Assembly urged States to: 
 
Refrain from recognizing forced marriages contracted abroad but, where it would be in 
the victim’s best interests, recognize the effects of the marriage insofar as this would 
enable the victim to secure rights which they could not otherwise claim.149 
 
 In addition to the fact that the resolutions of the Assembly are not binding, they too mitigate the 
absoluteness of the prohibitions by pleading on the best interests of the child.150 After all, all the 
international instruments cited above give States a discretion to assess each situation on a case-by-
case basis without an absolute obligation of non-recognition. However, even if the obligation of non-
recognition is not expressly stated in international instruments, it does not necessarily mean that such 
an obligation could not exist. The international community is after all bound to respect the 
fundamental human rights of all individuals and besides respecting the rights, they may as well have 
a positive obligation to protect individuals against human rights violations conducted by private 
actors.151 The issue of foreign child marriages give rise to several legal dilemmas and no matter how 
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States decide to act with respect to such marriage, the human rights of the child bride may be violated. 
This thesis has now provided a brief overview on the legal framework prohibiting or condemning 
child marriages and on the extent of obligations States have with respect to foreign child marriages. 
The focus will now be put on the legal dilemmas arising from the foreign child marriage itself and its 
non-recognition. 
 
3. Child-Brides in Europe and the Conflicting Norms 
3.1. Child Marriage and Peremptory Norms of International Law 
 
One interesting aspect in the context of child marriage is its contrasting with peremptory norms of 
international law. Peremptory norms, or the so-called jus cogens norms are general rules of 
international law that are “mandatory and imperative in all circumstances”152 and should therefore 
prevail over all other norms. The 1969 Vienna Convention defines peremptory norms as norms 
“accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which 
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character”153 and declares all treaties conflicting with such norms 
void.154 They constitute obligations erga omnes on States,155 obligations States have “towards the 
international community as a whole.”156 In Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) defined peremptory norms as a “concern of all States” and noted that all States have a “legal 
interest in their protection.”157 Among the peremptory norms recognized by the International Law 
Commission (ILC), the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment and the prohibition of slavery and 
forced labour158 are the relevant prohibitions to be discussed in the context of child marriage as it has 
been internationally recognized that child marriage may constitute either torture or slavery.159 In 
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addition to being internationally recognized peremptory norms, the prohibitions of torture and slavery 
are also listed as non-derogable rights in the ECHR.160  
 
As torture and slavery are recognized as peremptory norms of international law, they both may be 
applicable to the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC 
Articles), the instrument providing general rules for international responsibility of States. The ILC 
Articles applies only for “serious breaches” of peremptory norms and Article 40 lays down 
consequences for such breaches.161 For a breach of international law to fall within the scope of a 
“serious breach”, two conditions must be met. Firstly, the breach involved must concern an 
internationally recognized peremptory norm and secondly, it must attain a certain level of 
seriousness.162 For a breach to be serious enough to fall within the scope the ILC Articles, it must 
involve “a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfill…an obligation arising under 
a peremptory norm of general international law.”163 Moreover, for a breach to fall within the meaning 
of a “gross or systematic failure”, the breach shall be “carried out in an organized and deliberate way” 
with a level of intensity.164 
 
So, for a child marriage to fall within the scope of the ILC Articles, it must meet the two conditions 
of a “serious breach.” As it already has been argued, child marriage may constitute torture and ill-
treatment or slavery, both peremptory norms of international law.165 Whether “the intensity of the 
breach” in child marriages is serious enough for fulfilling the conditions of a “serious breach” is 
disputable while the Article does not present any procedures on how the seriousness of a breach is 
assessed.166 However, the International Law Commission suggests that when assessing whether a 
breach falls within the scope of Article 40, factors that should be considered are: “the intent to violate 
the norm; the scope and number of individual violations; and the gravity of their consequences for 
the victims.”167 While child marriages are prohibited in multiple international instruments and are 
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condemned by several UN bodies, it can be argued that States that allow underage marriages in their 
legislation168 do not violate human rights law unwittingly. The same assumption could apply to the 
recognition of child marriages; child marriage is a fundamental human rights violation and the 
recognition of a foreign child marriage could suggest that the recognizing State intently tolerates 
human rights violations within its State borders. When it comes to the scope and number of the 
violations, as well as on the consequences to the victims, it can be argued that as child marriage 
affects hundreds of millions of girls and leads to severe consequences on the victims, child marriage 
could be categorized as a “serious breach” of a peremptory norm and thus fall within the scope of the 
ILC Articles.  
 
If a child marriage falls within the scope of the ILC Articles, Article 41 is applied on the marriage. 
According to Article 41, “no State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious 
breach…nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”169 In situations where child 
marriage as a breach of a peremptory norm attains the level of seriousness and therefore falls within 
the scope of the ILC Articles, it can be argued that States have an obligation not to recognize such 
child marriage even if it was concluded abroad.  
 
However, it must be kept in mind that not all child marriages constitute slavery or torture and even if 
they do, they necessarily do not fall within the scope of the ILC Articles. A marriage concluded with 
consent of a 17-year-old child bride and a marriage concluded during a humanitarian crises between 
a 14-year-old girl and an older husband certainly fall in different categories and only the latter could 
potentially fall within the protection of the ILC Articles. Therefore, it cannot be argued that all 
situations of child marriages concluded abroad would fall within the scope of protection of serious 
breaches of peremptory norms of international law and should thus not be recognized by States. Each 
marriage should be considered on a case-by-case basis keeping in mind the intensity of the possible 
breach. 
 
3.2. Recognition of a Child Marriage and the Prohibition of Torture  
 
Only the most serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law fall within the scope of the 
ILC Articles. However, this does not mean that the less serious breaches would somehow be justified; 
States may nevertheless be liable for breaches of peremptory norms of international law if not 
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appropriately preventing such violations, even if the breach would not fulfil the requirements of a 
“serious breach” discussed in the previous chapter.170  
 
This thesis has argued that a child marriage may lead to violations of the prohibition of slavery as 
well as the prohibition of torture, both peremptory norms of international law. However, the focus 
will now be put on the latter. Article 3 of the ECHR in all its simplicity reads as follows: “No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”171 The Article 
does not provide any definitions to torture, nor inhuman or degrading punishment, but it becomes 
clear from the preparatory work of Article 3 that the Article was left intentionally broad. The simple 
and absolute Article is meant to “announce to the whole world that torture is wholly evil and 
absolutely to be condemned and no cause whatever…can justify its use or existence.”172 It simply 
states that “all torture is prohibited”, leaving no room for interpretation of whether some forms of 
torture could be legitimate. The preparatory work of the Article includes an exhaustive sentence 
describing the simple Article saying: “When this is stated in a legal document and in a diplomatic 
Convention, everything has been said. It is dangerous to want to say more, since the effect of the 
Convention is thereby limited”173 and thus suggests that the Article is drafted to cover multiple forms 
of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment.174  
 
The definitions to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment have evolved through time in European 
judicial bodies.175 The ECtHR has taken advantage of the broad wording and applied the Article to 
several different situations but in M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR concluded the 
requirements for an act to fall within the scope of Article 3 and held that:   
 
To fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of 
severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances 
of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical and mental effects and, 
in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim…Court considers 
treatment to be “inhuman” when it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch 
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and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering…and 
degrading when  it humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or 
diminishing, his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority 
capable of breaking an individual’s moral or physical resistance...It may suffice that the 
victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others.176 
 
International human rights law has traditionally imposed only negative obligations on States, that is 
to say, individuals have been protected against violations conducted by States. However, the 
obligations of States have developed during recent decades and it is today widely accepted that human 
rights law may as well give rise to positive obligations on States and the States are not only obliged 
to refrain from violating the rights, they must as well take all appropriate steps for protecting 
individuals against human rights violations conducted by third-parties, including violations of the 
prohibition of torture.177 The CAT Committee has held that:  
 
Where State authorities or others acting in official capacity or under colour of law, know 
or have reasonable grounds to believe that acts of torture or ill-treatment are being 
committed by non-State officials or private actors and they fail to exercise due diligence 
to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such non-State officials or private actors 
consistently with the Convention, the State bears responsibility.178  
 
The principle of due diligence the CAT Committee refers to is a guiding principle of 
international law179 that is relevant in the context of States’ positive obligations towards human 
rights law.180 According to the principle, States must “exercise due diligence”181 in addressing 
human rights violations committed by third-parties, that is to say, they must take all necessary 
steps in preventing and investigating such violations and in prosecuting and punishing the 
perpetrators and if they fail to do so, they may be held responsible for the violations.182 The 
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principle has also been addressed by the CEDAW Committee in A.T v. Hungary where it held 
that “States may be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent 
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing 
compensation”183 and in Fatima Yilidrim v. Austria, where it held that a State may be held 
responsible for human rights violations committed by third-parties if the authorities “knew or 
should have known” of the violation in question.184 In Osman v. UK, the ECtHR held that there 
must be a “known risk of real, direct and immediate threat” for a positive obligation to be 
implied on a State185 and in A v. the United Kingdom, the ECHR applied the principle of due 
diligence to Article 3 of the ECHR and held:  
 
The obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the 
Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to 
ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private 
individuals.186 
 
The Court continued by noting that “children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are 
entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against such serious breaches of 
personal integrity.”187 As the ECtHR, the CAT Committee has also referred to the special need of 
protection of vulnerable groups of individuals and listed asylum-seekers and refugees as vulnerable 
groups of individuals in need of special protection.188 While discussing the vulnerable groups and 
their protection, the CAT Committee noted that: 
 
State parties should, therefore, ensure the protection of members of groups especially at 
risk of being tortured, by fully prosecuting and punishing all acts of violence and abuse 
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against these individuals and ensuring implementation of other positive measures of 
prevention and protection.189 
 
Both the case law of the ECtHR, as well as the commentary of the CAT Committee refer that 
migrating child brides, as children, refugees and asylum-seekers, are a particularly vulnerable group 
and thus in need of special protection against torture and ill-treatment. The CAT Committee has also 
referred to the principle of due diligence in the context of gender-based violence by noting that the 
principle has been applied “to States parties’ failure to prevent and protect victims from gender-based 
violence, such as rape, domestic violence, female genital mutilation, and trafficking.”190 As child 
marriage is a form of gender-based violence,191 it can be argued that while States have an obligation 
to exercise due diligence in preventing gender-based violence, they must take all appropriate 
measures in preventing child marriage as well. In Opuz v. Turkey, Turkey had failed to protect victims 
of domestic violence against women by not taking all necessary measures to prevent the violence 
from happening even if there was a “real and imminent risk of assault they knew or ought to have 
know about.”192 Because of Turkey’s “inaction” and “ineffectiveness”, they had failed to protect the 
applicant “against serious breaches of the applicant’s personal integrity by her husband”193 and was 
therefore held liable for violating Article 3 of the ECHR.194  
 
All in all, the principle of due diligence is important in the context of child marriages as child marriage 
is a human rights violation conducted by private actors and a violation of which State parties know 
about at the time the child bride seeks asylum or a residence permit. Child marriage causes “real, 
direct and immediate threats”195 of both physical and psychological violence196 and would thus fall 
within the scope of the obligation to exercise due diligence in protecting the child against torture and 
ill-treatment. According to the principle, States are obliged to diligently prevent child marriages from 
occurring, investigate such marriages and to prosecute and punish perpetrators. The Group of Experts 
on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO) that monitors the 
implementation of the Istanbul Convention held in their report from 2018 that while Turkey has not 
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criminalized forced marriages, they have failed to act diligently in preventing such marriages from 
occurring.197 Therefore, it can be argued that all States should properly criminalize child marriages 
that may expose the children to torture and ill-treatment and refuse to recognize such marriages and 
if a State fails to do so, that State could be held liable for violating Article 3 of the ECHR.  
 
Even if the recognition of a child marriage may violate Article 3 of the ECHR if the child is exposed 
to torture or ill-treatment in the marriage, it must again be kept in mind that not all child marriages 
lead to torture or ill-treatment; only the ones which, in the words of Juan Mendez, “inflict long-term 
physical and psychological harm on victims.”198 The principle of due diligence obliges States to 
appropriately protect the girls against violations of Article 3, but can a total ban on the recognition of 
child marriages concluded abroad protect child brides from torture and ill-treatment deriving from 
such marriages? The non-recognition of a child marriage arguably protects the child from violations 
of Article 3 caused by the marriage if the child is exposed to such treatment in the marriage. However, 
while not all child marriages expose the child brides to torture or ill-treatment, is a total ban on the 
non-recognition of child marriages concluded abroad a reasonable mean for protecting children from 
violations of Article 3? Does non-recognition of child marriages deter such marriages or rather 
prevent them from landing within the borders of the non-recognizing State? These questions will 
further be discussed in Chapter 4 but at this point, it can be concluded that some child marriages may 
constitute torture and ill-treatment and if so, States are under an obligation to protect the child bride 
from such treatment. If they fail to do so, they may be held liable for violations under Article 3. 
However, how does the non-recognition of a foreign child marriage affect the protection under Article 
3 of the ECHR? 
 
3.3. Non-Recognition of a Child Marriage and the Prohibition of Torture  
 
The recognition of a child marriage may expose the child directly to torture and ill-treatment if the 
child is left to the harmful union. However, child brides who apply asylum or a permanent residence 
for family reunification purposes are most likely outside EU in their States of origin where they often 
live in the middle of war, humanitarian crises or may otherwise be exposed to human rights violations, 
some even to torture or ill-treatment. The non-recognition of a child marriage where the husband 
already has a permanent residence within EU would mean that the family reunification application is 
denied and that the child bride is left to her State of origin, at least while a possible asylum on 
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individual grounds is accepted. Because of the positive obligation of States to secure human rights of 
everyone within their jurisdiction and because an asylum-, or a permanent residence application 
would bring the child bride under the jurisdiction of the ECHR, it is appropriate to analyse whether 
the non-recognition of a child marriage leading to a denied family reunification or asylum application 
could lead to violations of Article 3 of the ECHR. 
 
ECtHR does not delimit any forms of treatment from the scope of Article 3 as long as a minimum 
level of severity is attained and suggests that all situations should be considered on a case-by-case 
basis taking into consideration all facts of the case.199 The Court also indicates that a pure humiliating 
treatment could fall within the scope of the Article. In M.S.S case, the ECtHR applied Article 3 on 
poor living conditions of an asylum seeker and held that:  
 
Article 3 of the Convention requires the State to ensure that detention conditions are 
compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution 
of the measure do not subject the detainees to distress or hardship of an intensity 
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the 
practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured.200  
 
In M.S.S case, ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 while the States had not properly ensured the 
well-being of the asylum seeker and because the living conditions caused the applicant mental 
suffering and arose “feelings of humiliation and debasement.”201 It also gave weight to the fact that 
the applicant, as an asylum seeker, was in a particularly vulnerable situation and was thus “in need 
of special protection.”202 In Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the Court gave even more weight on the 
vulnerability of the applicant while he was not only an asylum seeker, but also a child203 and found 
that “extreme material poverty can raise an issue under Article 3.”204 In V.M. and others v. Belgium, 
which also concerned living conditions incompatible with Article 3, in addition to giving particular 
importance on the fact that the applicants where asylum seekers, the Court held that the applicants 
were “victims of treatment which failed to respect their dignity” and that the poor living-conditions 
on the streets aroused in them “feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of inducing 
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desperation” and as degrading treatment fell within the scope of Article 3 of ECHR.205 In Z and 
Others v. The United Kingdom, the Court held that authorities had breached their positive obligation 
to protect children from ill-treatment by their parents by not taking appropriate measures to end the 
ill-treatment206 and found that States “should provide effective protection, in particular, of children 
and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the 
authorities had or ought to have had knowledge.”207 
 
The particularly vulnerable child brides, whose family reunification applications are denied because 
of an annulled marriage may be left to conflict zones, or to poor and unsecure living conditions in 
refugee camps. While they are during the asylum- or family reunification process under the 
jurisdiction of the EU State concerned, it can be argued that the non-recognition of a child marriage 
which leads to a denied application may as well lead to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR if the 
applicant will thus be left in poor living conditions causing fear and desperation, failing to respect the 
human dignity of the child bride. Because of the positive obligation of State Parties to protect 
individuals against violations of Article 3, it can be argued that States may be held responsible for 
the ill-treatment the child brides are exposed to if they are left to their countries of origin because of 
a denied family reunification application and if the State has failed to inform the child bride about the 
possibility to apply for asylum on individual grounds. States are obliged to exercise due diligence in 
addressing possible human rights violations within their jurisdiction and are thus obliged to take all 
necessary steps to protect the child brides from ill-treatment in their States during an asylum-, or a 
permanent residence application process.  
 
At this point of this thesis, it seems clear that while a denial of a family reunification application on 
grounds of a non-recognized marriage may lead to a breach of the prohibition of torture and ill-
treatment, all situations concerning a foreign child marriage should be considered on a case-by-case 
basis and therefore, it can be argued that a total ban on the recognition of child marriages concluded 
abroad is not compatible with States’ obligations under international human rights law. 
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3.4. Right to Respect for Private and Family Life  
 
The right to respect for private and family life is protected in Article 8 of the ECHR which reads as 
follows: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
correspondence”208 and thus protects individuals against arbitrary interference by public officials in 
their “family life”, “private life”, “home” or “correspondence.”209 In situations where a marriage is 
not recognized, it can be argued that the non-recognition of the marriage interferes with the couples’ 
right to family life; the married couple is deprived their right to be a wife and a husband.  
 
For falling within the protection of Article 8, the protected right must amount to “family life” and for 
assessing whether such life exists, the term “family” must be given a definition. The definition of a 
“family” has evolved in the ECtHR through time and there is no straightforward answer to what 
constitutes as “family life”; it is decided in the Court on a case-by-case basis.
210 
The Court has held 
that a ”lawful and genuine marriage…has to be regarded as ”family life””211 but while child marriages 
are necessarily not regarded as “lawful and genuine” marriages in Europe even if they had been 
concluded abroad,212 marriages regarded as child marriages may not fall within the protection of 
Article 8 purely because of the existing union. However, a marriage is not always required when 
assessing whether “family life” exists; the Court must also take into consideration the existence of 
“close personal ties.” A child born to a marriage is automatically part of family life but when it comes 
to couples, the Court has held that in addition to a legal and valid marriage, family life may as well 
be based on “de facto relationships.”213  
So, in addition to a lawful and genuine marriage, the Court should also consider several other factors 
in the relationship.214 Factors, which ECtHR has taken into consideration when it has assessed 
whether a relationship between a couple amounts to a de facto relationship are “whether the couple 
live together, the length of their relationship and whether they have demonstrated their commitment 
to each other by having children together or by any other means.”215 The ECtHR has also taken into 
                                                
208 ECHR Art. 8.1. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Roagna, Ivana, ‘Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human 
Rights’, Council of Europe human rights handbooks, Strasbourg, 2012, pp. 27-28. 
211 Berrehab v. The Netherlands, app. no 10730/84 (ECtHR 21/06/1988) para. 21. 
212 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. The United Kingdom, app. no. 9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81 (ECtHR 28/05/1985), 
para. 63. 
213 Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, app. no. 50963/99 (ECtHR 20/06/2002), para. 112. 
214 Ibid. 
215 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, app. no. 75/1995/581/1997 (ECtHR 22/04/667) para. 36. 
 35 
consideration whether alleged family members have been “dependent members” of a family.216 Even 
if the Court has held that Article 8 does not impose an obligation to recognize purely religious 
marriages217 or marriages concluded by a child per se,218 it has found family life from a religious 
marriage as well. In Serife Yigit v. Turkey, a case concerning a religious marriage, the Court held that 
family life should not be “confined solely to marriage-based relationships and may encompass other 
de facto family ties where the parties are living together outside of marriage.”219 In Z.H and R.H v. 
Switzerland, an Iranian couple seeking asylum from Switzerland had concluded a religious marriage 
when the bride was only 14 years old. In this particular case, the Court held that Article 8 does not 
impose an obligation on State Parties to recognize a marriage concluded at the time one of the parties 
was 14 years old.220 However, judge Nicolau questioned the fact that the Court did not take into 
consideration that despite of the void child marriage, some other form of de facto relationship could 
exist between the applicants. Judge Nicolau held that the fact that there was no legal marriage “could 
not exhaust the question of whether the applicants did or did not have a family life together.”221 
Accordingly, religious marriages and child marriages can fall within the protection of Article 8 if a 
de facto relationship exists.222 When courts consider whether a child marriage falls under the scope 
of Article 8, they should consider the nature of the relationship between the bride and the husband. 
As dependency and the means by which the couple is committed to each other are relevant factors to 
be considered in possible de facto relationships, it can be argued that for a child marriage to fall within 
the scope of Article 8, the marriage shall be concluded with a full, free and informed consent of the 
child bride. In situations where the child is forcibly married off to her husband, the husband often 
exercises full control over the child whose several rights are violated through the marriage. In such 
marriages, the relationship constitutes rather as “ownership”223 than a marriage involving “close 
personal ties”224 required in a de facto relationship. When considering if a de facto relationship exists, 
it is also important to take the child brides’ own views into account within the limits of her age and 
maturity.225 The child bride has the right to be heard in all matters concerning her, including her 
family life. Her own views are important as long as she can express the views freely,226 that is to say, 
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if the marriage is concluded with a free consent of the child bride and if her opinions are not 
manipulated by the husband. 
All in all, States may be obliged to recognize some child marriages concluded abroad as de facto 
relationships and therefore, a total ban on the recognition of child marriages may constitute a violation 
of Article 8 of the ECHR. However, the right to family life is not an absolute right and it can therefore 
be limited in certain situations by the State. The limitations on the right to family life will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
Nevertheless, the primary purpose of Article 8 of the Convention is to protect individuals against 
arbitrary interference by authorities.227 However, because it is generally recognized that States may 
as well have positive obligations towards securing the rights set in the Convention, the State Parties 
are not only obliged to refrain from violating Article 8, they may as well be obliged to secure the 
right to family life by enabling family ties and by reuniting families by admitting non-nationals into 
their territories through family reunification applications. The ECtHR has held that “in order to 
establish the scope of State’s obligations, the facts of the case must be considered.”228 The Court must 
consider whether it would be possible for the family to live safely in their country of origin as well 
as the factors that could have a negative impact on the receiving State if accepting the family 
reunification application.229 It must then “strike a fair balance between the applicant’s interests on the 
one hand and its own interest in controlling immigration on the other.”230 It must also take into 
consideration the timing on which the family life was created; if it is clear that the family life was 
created for making use of the immigration status of one of the spouses, the refusal of a family 
reunification application will most likely not violate Article 8 of the Convention.231 
 
Both in Sen v. Netherland and in Tuquabo-Tekle and others v. the Netherlands, the Court held that 
the States were obliged to secure the right to family life by allowing the entry of an alien to their 
territories because it was the “most adequate mean” for developing family life together232 and 
therefore, the States had failed “to strike a fair balance between the applicant’s interests on the one 
hand and its own interest in controlling immigration on the other.”233 In Mehemi v. France, ECtHR 
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held that “where the existence of a family tie has been established, the State must in principle act in 
a manner calculated to enable that tie to be developed and take measures that will enable the family 
to be reunited.”234 So even if state sovereignty allows States to control who they let into their 
territories,235 States may as well have a positive obligation to secure the right to family life by 
admitting aliens into their territories if it is the “most adequate mean” to develop existing family life 
together236 and if the access of the non-national within State borders does not endanger the public 
order of the State.237 Therefore, it can be argued that a State may have an obligation to reunite child 
brides with their husbands when family reunification is applied if it is the “most adequate mean”238 
for them to develop their family life together if such family life exists through a de facto relationship 
concluded with mutual consent of the spouses. 
 
4. Balancing Child Marriage and the Conflicting Norms 
4.1. Limiting the Rights Enshrined in the ECHR 
 
It has now been argued that both the non-recognition, as well as the recognition of foreign child 
marriages in EU States may violate fundamental rights of the child bride. However, not all ECHR 
rights are absolute and may be limited in certain circumstances. So, even if an EU State violates the 
rights of a child bride by refusing to recognize the marriage or by recognizing it and thus exposing 
the child to human rights violations caused by the union, sometimes a violation on a right enshrined 
in the ECHR may be justified.  
 
According to Article 15 of the Convention, derogation of the rights in the Convention is allowed “in 
time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation” but only “to the extent strictly 
required.”239 However, the Article also states that derogation from articles 2, 4, 7 and 3 is never 
permitted.240 The previous chapter discussed the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in the context 
of child marriage and reached to a conclusion that sometimes both the recognition, as well as the non-
recognition of child marriages may constitute a violation of Article 3. While derogation from the 
Article is not permitted, how can a situation where both scenarios violate the rights of the child bride 
be solved? This scenario will be discussed further in the last sub-chapter addressing the standard of 
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the best interests of a child and the focus will now be put on the rights from which derogation is 
permitted. 
 
In addition to situations of war and emergency, the Convention provides more explicit restrictions on 
certain rights in the Convention. Article 8 of the Convention, protecting the right to respect for private 
and family life, allows limitations to the right in certain circumstances. The Article protects 
individuals against arbitrary interference in their private and family life per se, but its second 
paragraph imposes possible limitations on the right by stating:  
 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.241 
 
In other words, even if it already has been argued that the non-recognition of a child marriage 
may constitute a violation of Article 8, the non-recognition of the marriage may be justified if 
the interference is “in accordance with the law” and is “necessary in a democratic society” for 
achieving one or more of the legitimate aims listed in the second paragraph.242 
So, when an interference occurs, the first thing the court has to consider is whether the interference 
has been “in accordance with the law.”243 The ECtHR has held that the interference occurred must be 
in accordance with domestic law, and the law in question must as well be “accessible to the person 
concerned, who must moreover be able to foresee its consequences for him, and compatible with the 
rule of law.”244 The Court has held that by “law”, the ECHR refers to “the law in force in a given 
legal system”, referring to both written law and unwritten law and on case law as well as on 
international legislation.245 
All in all, whether an interference on the right to family life has been ‘in accordance with the law’ 
depends on national, as well as on international legislation. In States where child marriages are banned 
in national legislation, an interference with the right is naturally in accordance with national law, but 
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whether it is in accordance with the international obligations of the State remains as a debated issue 
and naturally, as the issue of this study.  
Imagine that the interference of the right to family life by not recognizing a child marriage was in 
accordance with the law. This is not enough. After this is proven, the State must as well prove that 
the interference to family life has been  “necessary in a democratic society” for achieving the 
legitimate aim of the restriction.246 The UK Supreme Court has held that the legitimate aim in the 
restriction to the right to family life by refusing to grant marriage visas for couples under the age of 
21247 was the “protection of the rights and freedoms or others”, namely the right not to be forcibly 
married.248 Nevertheless, when European States have enacted laws banning child marriages entirely 
within their State borders, their legitimate aim has most likely been the protection against forced 
marriage and child marriage. The lawfulness of an interference, or the existence of a legitimate aim 
is rarely contested in ECtHR.249 However, for an interference on ECHR rights to be legal, the 
interference must also be “necessary in a democratic society.”250  
In Silver case, the ECtHR summarized principles governing the phrase ‘necessary in a democratic 
society.’ It emphasized two principles in assessing the necessity of an interference; the proportionality 
test and margin of appreciation.251 These two principles will be analysed further in this chapter and 
applied on the recognition and non-recognition of foreign child marriages but at first, another 
fundamental principle that should be considered at all times when limiting, as well as fulfilling rights 
in the ECHR will be discussed: the prohibition of discrimination. 
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4.2. Prohibition of Discrimination 
 
Certain rights enshrined in the ECtHR may be limited within the limits of the principle of 
proportionality and margin of appreciation but when limiting rights, a principle that must be taken 
into account is the principle of non-discrimination. The principle of non-discrimination is a principle 
of international law which, together with equality, form a basis on international human rights law.252 
The principle is enshrined in almost every international treaty in one way or another and has become 
one of the fundamental principles of international human rights law.253 The ECHR Article 14 reads 
as follows: 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, political opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.254 
 
Article 14 guarantees that all human rights in the Convention are protected without discrimination 
and together with Article 1 of the ECHR, which obliges States to secure the rights in the Convention 
“to everyone within their jurisdiction”,255 it ensures that all Convention rights are applied to everyone 
within the State’s jurisdiction.  
 
The ECtHR has held that “discrimination means treating differently, without objective and reasonable 
justification, persons in relevantly similar situations”256 referring to the ten grounds for discrimination 
explicitly listed in Article 14. Even if being a child bride is not explicitly listed as a ground for 
discrimination in the Article, the ECtHR has applied the ground “other status” on several other 
distinct groups of people in a similar situation explicitly not listed in the Article.257 In Bah v. The 
United Kingdom, ECtHR held that immigrants fall in a group in a similar situation and can thus fall 
under the protection of the Articles’ protected ground “other status”258 whereas in Serife Yigit v. 
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Turkey, the ECtHR applied “other status” on marital status as a ground for discrimination.259 While, 
according to the ECtHR case-law, both immigrants and married persons compose groups of people 
in a similar situation and should thus not be treated differently, it can be argued that also child brides 
are a group of people in a similar situation and should not be treated differently without a justification. 
Moreover, as ECtHR has held that marital status can amount to a ground for discrimination,260 it can 
be argued that child brides, as married persons, should be treated in a similar manner than others who 
are married per se.  
 
Whenever a State treats differently persons in a similar situation, there must be an “objective and 
reasonable justification”, it has to “pursue a legitimate aim” and there has to be a “reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.”261 In 
other words, the principle of proportionality, discussed further in the next sub-chapter, must be 
applied not only when States limit rights of a person, but also when they treat groups of people 
differently. So, when States set minimum age limits for spouses seeking asylum or residence permit 
for family reunification purpose,262 allow exceptions to the marriageable age of 18 for their nationals 
but refuse to recognize foreign child marriages,263 or simply violate a child brides’ right to family life 
by not recognizing the union and at the same time allow other married couples enjoy their family life 
without interference by authorities, the States must be able to justify their actions. Limitations on the 
rights in the ECHR should not expose persons to discrimination without a reasonable objective which 
is assessed with the help of the proportionality test discussed next. 
 
4.3. Principle of Proportionality 
 
The principle of proportionality is a fundamental principle that requires that restrictions to human 
rights must be reasonable. Even if the States are offered a certain margin of appreciation264 in 
assessing the reasonableness of a restriction, the ECtHR must ensure that the rights enshrined in the 
Convention are not unnecessarily restricted. In other words, there must be a balance between the 
undertaken restrictions to the right and the aim pursued. The proportionality test used by the ECtHR 
in case law appears to have different versions depending on the context of the issue and the restricted 
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right in question.265 The Court has called for a “pressing social need” for the restriction and considered 
whether the reasons for the interference were “relevant and sufficient.”266 It has also found that a 
“”fair balance” must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”267 In the UK Supreme Court, 
the Court has also considered the ”adequacy” of the restriction, namely, whether the purported aim 
of the restriction was important enough for justifying a limitation on the right and whether the 
restriction was ”rationally connected” to the aim.268 In Silver case, where the ECtHR considered 
limitations on Article 8 of the ECHR, the Court summarized that for a restriction on a Convention 
right to be compatible with the Convention, the interference must correspond to a “pressing social 
need” and be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and thus referred to the principle of 
proportionality.269 
 
Due to the large scale problem of child marriages, it can be argued that a legislative objective of 
preventing child marriages could be a sufficiently important aim “to justify limiting a fundamental 
right.”270 However, as the restriction must as well be reasonable, the costs and benefits of the 
restriction must be balanced.271 In UK Supreme Court, Lord Wilson questioned the number of forced 
marriages an amendment denying marriage visas for couples under the age of 21deters and found that 
“the number of unforced marriages which it obstructs from their intended development for up to three 
years vastly exceeds the number of forced marriages which it deters” and therefore, the amendment 
does not ”strike a fair balance between the rights of the parties to unforced marriages and the interests 
of the community in preventing forced marriages”, and is not therefore necessary for achieving the 
purported aim of the amendment.272  
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The central question is, can a total ban on the recognition of foreign child marriages and thus a 
restriction on the right to family life deter child marriages? Lord Wilson did not find an amendment 
denying marriage visas for couples under the age of 21 as a reasonable restriction for the aim pursued, 
namely, the preventing of forced marriages. As all child marriages do not constitute human rights 
violations, it could be argued that a total ban on the recognition of such marriages is not suitable for 
preventing child marriages as it also obstructs the child marriages that are not harmful for the child 
bride. Nevertheless, as foreign child marriages are concluded abroad, a total ban on the recognition 
of such marriages in another State most likely does not deter child marriages in that State where they 
are concluded, rather prevents them from landing within the borders of the State refusing to recognize 
such marriages. A total ban on the recognition of foreign child marriages and thus an interference in 
the family life of the child brides cannot be seen as a proportionate response to preventing child 
marriages. Therefore, it can also be argued that a total ban on the recognition of child marriages and 
thus different treatment of foreign child brides and married national cannot be justified under the 
principle of non-discrimination. However, it can be argued that Article 8 could proportionally be 
restricted in individual circumstances “for the protection of the rights of others”,273 namely for the 
protection of the child bride. So, all in all, each case should be considered individually. A total ban 
on child marriages is not a proportionate response on deterring child marriages while it does not end 
child marriages. However, when a child bride is in need of protection and her rights are clearly 
violated because of ending up as a child bride, a State may limit the right to family life by refusing to 
recognize a foreign child marriage for the protection of the child bride because such a limitation is 
proportionate to the aim pursued. 
 
4.4. Margin of Appreciation 
 
Legal traditions, national values and cultures differ between States. Even if human rights are 
universal, after all, it is the national constitutions of each State that determine how and to what extent 
the rights are protected and therefore, there are differences in the protection of the rights between 
States.274 While States share the same fundamental rights but do not necessarily share the same values, 
the ECtHR must find a way for an efficient protection of human rights while at the same time, respect 
the values and cultures of each State. For an effective human rights protection, the ECtHR has 
established a standard called the margin of appreciation.275 
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As previously discussed, some Convention rights may be limited under certain conditions if 
“necessary in a democratic society.”276 This is where the doctrine of margin of appreciation comes 
into play; it is considered that domestic courts and authorities are in the best place in assessing 
whether an interference to a right is necessary and reasonable for protecting the interests of that 
State.277 While the principle of proportionality is all about balancing interests,278 the margin of 
appreciation affords States a certain amount of discretion to determine whether a restriction to a right 
can be justified.279 So, margin of appreciation is an important mean for finding balance when different 
legal values and cultures conflict with each other. 
In Handyside v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR explained the extent to which the rights of the 
Convention could be limited by stating:  
 
This margin of appreciation is given both to the domestic legislator (‘prescribed by law’) 
and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and apply the 
laws in force…The domestic margin of appreciation…goes hand in hand with a European 
supervision. Such supervision concerns both the aim of the measure challenged and its 
‘necessity’; it covers not only the basic legislation but also the decision applying it; even 
one given by an independent Court.280 
 
All in all, even if States are primarily responsible for securing the rights in the Convention281 and 
they have been given a discretion in limiting the rights, the ECtHR must ensure that the rights are 
effectively protected within national borders. After all, it is for the ECtHR to decide if domestic courts 
and authorities have used their margin of appreciation within the limits of the Convention. 
The extent of margin of appreciation differs between rights. As the ECtHR has held, “the scope of 
the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its 
background.”282 When assessing the scope of margin of appreciation States have, how States 
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generally regulate the issue at stake must be taken into account.283 If States apparently share a practice 
regarding the issue at stake, the margin of appreciation States enjoy is narrow. If there are apparent 
diversities in the laws and practices between States, the margin of appreciation is wider and 
limitations in Convention rights are easier to justify.284 For example in immigration control, States 
have the right, at least to some extent to decide who they let into their territories285 and in the 
protection of children’s rights and family life, States have been given a wide discretion in making 
decisions concerning families and children’s welfare because there are so much diversities between 
cultures with respect to family life.286  
Margin of appreciation applies on Article 8 protecting the right to family life, but it has also been 
applied even on the non-derogable right of the prohibition of torture protected in Article 3.287 In 
Valiuliene v. Lithuania, the ECtHR found that:  
 
State’s responsibility under Article 3 of the Convention…within the limits of the 
Convention, the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 3 in the sphere of 
the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls within 
the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation, provided that criminal-law mechanisms 
are available to the victim.288  
 
However, as the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is a non-derogable right, States do not enjoy 
a margin of appreciation concerning possible limitations on Article 3. In Valiuliene, the State was left 
a discretion in the “choice of means” Article 3 is secured and therefore, it can be argued that margin 
of appreciation does not apply on Article 3 in the same manner as it does on Article 8. 
 
When it comes to child marriages, margin of appreciation comes into play in several fields concerning 
the practice. States that have laws permitting marriages under the age of 18 have used their margin 
of appreciation in regulating the marriageable age. Different cultures and religions affect the concept 
of marriage and therefore, the legal age for marriage differ between States. For example, the Muslim 
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Marriage and Divorce Act of Sri Lanka sets 12 as a minimum age for marriage for girls289 and Iran 
allows marriages for girls from 13 years.290 However, both Acts can be seen controversial in the eyes 
of international law, regardless of the margin of appreciation. Even if exceptions to the marriageable 
age are allowed in certain situations, as it already was argued in chapter 2, all marriages under the 
age of 16 could be considered as illegal even if this is not explicitly stated in a legally binding 
instrument or by a judicial body.291   
 
Margin of appreciation allows States to take cultural and traditional factors into consideration while 
limiting the rights in the Convention. However, the assumption that culture and traditions can affect 
the enjoyment of fundamental rights seems controversial. While all human rights are universal, all 
rights should be equal “regardless of the culture into which the individual happens to be born.”292 
When it comes to the marriageable age and culture, the joint general comment of the CEDAW 
Committee and the CRC Committee that allows exceptions to the marriageable age of 18 holds that 
such exceptions shall not be defended with culture or religion.293 When Finland finally in 2019 
removed the possibility to conclude marriages under the age of 18 in exceptional situations, the 
Finnish former minister of Justice conformed the joint general comment by noting that culture and 
religion shall never overrule the protection of children.294 So even if States enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation concerning family life issues, different cultures and values should not affect the legal 
age for marriage.  
 
When it comes to the non-recognition of child marriages concluded abroad, States may in certain 
circumstances limit the right to family life by refusing to recognize child marriages concluded abroad 
and control their immigration by refusing to accept family reunification applications from families 
compromised of a child marriage. Some European States have taken advantage of this discretion by 
enacting laws banning the recognition of foreign child marriages entirely within their State borders 
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and thus limiting the child brides’ right to family life. However, the ECtHR has held that “a general, 
automatic, indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right falls outside any 
acceptable margin of appreciation.”295 The ECtHR did not specify what these “vitally important” 
rights are.296 The term can refer to only certain rights in the Convention which are considered vital, 
but the author interprets this as referring to all fundamental rights in the Convention. 
 
A total ban on the recognition of foreign child marriages can without doubt be considered as an 
automatic and indiscriminate restriction while it automatically applies on all married couples were at 
least one of the spouses is under the age of 18 and affects the family life of immigrants only. 
Therefore, it can be argued that laws banning automatically all child marriages concluded abroad falls 
outside States’ margin of appreciation and therefore, States that do not consider such marriages on an 
individual basis are not conforming their obligations under the Convention. 
 
4.5. Ordre Public in Private International Law 
 
Per se, States are committed to enforce foreign rights that are legally acquired abroad.297 Foreign laws 
and rights give rise to obligations that should be enforced all over the world. Even if a right did not 
exist as such in the legislation of a State, “it is a principle of every civilized law that vested rights 
shall be protected.”298 When foreign rights are enforced in national courts, the fact that the right 
applied is necessarily not convergent with national law must basically be tolerated.299 The legislation 
of each State differ and sometimes the forum State may not even have legislation concerning the 
particular right at issue; this does not mean that the particular right should not be enforced.300 
However, if the applied foreign law contradicts with national law of the forum State so significantly, 
that the enforcement of such law would violate the fundamental norms of that State and contradicts 
with the public policy of that State, the domestic court may invoke on the principle of ordre public 
in private international law and refuse to apply such law.301 So, enforced rights are protected abroad 
as long as the nature of the right is not contrary to the public policy and morals of the forum State.302 
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While choosing the applicable law and thus refusing to apply foreign legislation, the conflict with the 
public policy and morals of the forum State must be significant.303 As Justice Cardozo has noted:  
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to 
suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless 
help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of 
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.304  
However, ordre public is not defined in legislation305 and while the limits of public order and morals 
differ between States,306 the standards under which courts are allowed to reject foreign law remains 
unclear. An exhaustive definition for the concept of ordre public would not even be possible taking 
into consideration the nature of the principle.307 For example in France, ordre public is applied “where 
the foreign rule is contrary to the morals of civilized society; or where the foreign law threatens the 
character of French civilization”308 whereas under the German statue, ordre public is “directed toward 
non-German laws and excludes their application whenever they would be contrary to good morals or 
would work against the policy of German law.”309 
When assessing whether ordre public is applicable, the connection the issue and the parties have to 
the forum State shall be considered. If they are strongly linked to each other, the threshold for 
applying the principle is lower than in situations where the issue at stake is only weakly connected to 
the forum State.310 However, in situations where a particular law clearly violates fundamental human 
rights or peremptory norms of international law, ordre public applies despite of the nature of the 
connection the particular issue have to the State; these norms always apply in situations where there 
is a conflict of laws.311 All in all, each situation shall be considered on a case-by-case basis taking 
into consideration international norms, as well as the norms of the society and the changing values 
and interests.312 Within Member States of the EU, ordre public principle is also always applicable in 
situations where a foreign norm conflicts with the ECHR and the Treaty of the European Union.313 
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So the foreign right enforced must not only be in line with national public policies and morals but 
with the ECHR as well.314 
ECHR refers to ordre public in two Articles in Section 1: Article 6 protecting the right to a fair trial315 
and in Article 9 protecting the freedom of thought, conscience and religion.316 Even if Article 8(2) 
allows restrictions to the right to private and family life for legitimate purposes like Article 9 does, 
Article 8 does not explicitly allow restrictions to the right on grounds of public order.317 Nevertheless, 
according to the case law of the ECtHR, ordre public can be applied on other Convention rights as 
well. In S.A.S. v. France, the ECtHR considered whether a ban on clothing covering one’s face 
violated the right to private and family life and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion318 
and introduced an approach where it subsumed ordre public under the legitimate aim “for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”,319 a legitimate aim explicitly mentioned in Article 
8(2). The legitimate aim “the rights and freedoms of others”320 has traditionally referred to other 
ECHR rights,321 but in S.A.S case, the Court linked it to a French principle vivre ensemble (“living 
together”)322 by stating:  
 
The Court…can understand the view that individuals who are present in places open to 
all may not wish to see practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally 
call into question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of 
an established consensus, forms an indispensable element of community life within the 
society in question. The Court is therefore able to accept that the barrier raised against 
others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching the 
right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier.323 
 
With its reasoning, the Court enabled the legitimate aim ‘rights of others’ to be applied on other rights 
outside the Convention rights as well, including living together easier and thus also allowed the 
                                                
314 Mikkola (2016) p. 14. 
315 ECHR, Art. 6.1. 
316 Ibid., Art. 9.2. 
317 Ibid., Art. 8.2. 
318 S.A.S. v. France, app. no. 43835/11 (ECtHR 01/07/2014) para. 3. 
319 Ibid., para. 117, see also Erlings, Esther, ‘The Government did not refer to it’: SAS v. France and ordre public at the 
European Court of Human Rights, Melbourne Journal of International Law, vol. 16, (2015) p. 15 and ECHR, Art. 8.2. 
320 ECHR, Art. 8.2. 
321 Erlings (2015) p. 7. 
322 S.A.S. v. France (2014) para. 121, see also para. 17. 
323 Ibid., para. 122 
 50 
principle of ordre public to be applied on articles not explicitly listing public order as a ground for 
limitation, including Article 8 protecting the right to private and family life.  
Nevertheless, there is not much case law concerning ordre public324 while most cases with conflict 
of laws are settled using other principles of law.325 However, in a Finnish Highest Administrative 
Court case,326 the Court held that a marriage legally concluded in Syria between a husband and a 15-
year girl currently living in Finland was against Finnish ordre public. Even if marriages legally 
concluded abroad are generally valid in Finland as well,327 the Court referred to the Finnish Marriage 
Act328 by stating: “a provision in the law of a foreign State shall be disregarded, if its application 
would have an outcome contrary to Finnish public policy (ordre public)”329 and held that a marriage 
where at least one party was under the age of 16 at the time the marriage was concluded was a situation 
where the principle of ordre public should be applied even if Finnish law at that time allowed children 
under the age of 16 to marry in exceptional situations.330 
When a child bride migrates to Europe, European States must consider whether the marriage legally 
concluded abroad is enforced in Europe as well or whether the marriage is contrary to the public 
policy and morals of the forum State and could thus not be recognized under the ordre public 
principle. As already discussed in this thesis, child marriages are strongly condemned in Europe. It is 
understood that a child marriage may violate several fundamental human rights norms and 
occasionally even peremptory norms of international law and while ordre public is applicable in 
situations where a foreign right conflicts with European norms and values, it could be argued that 
national courts in Europe have the power to refuse to enforce such marriages. Furthermore, the Family 
Reunification Directive addresses ordre public with respect to family reunification applications. 
According to Article 6 of the Directive, a family reunification application by a family member may 
be rejected “on grounds of public policy, public security or public health”331 and therefore, the Article 
could justify denied family reunification applications on grounds of child marriage. 
However, as discussed, ordre public is not defined in legislation and therefore, there is no clear 
standards under which the principle is applied. Each case is considered on a case-by-case basis in 
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domestic courts so it cannot be argued that States automatically have the right to apply ordre public 
on child marriages concluded abroad. However, it certainly is a principle to be considered with respect 
to child marriages while such marriages often are in conflict with European, as well as national public 
policies and morals.  
 
4.6. Standard of the Best Interests of a Child  
 
As discussed, sometimes even the most fundamental norms may conflict with each other. When it 
comes to child marriages concluded abroad, States may face a situation where they have to balance 
between immigration control and the right to family life, or assess whether a child marriage concluded 
abroad should be recognized or not while both scenarios could expose the child to torture or ill-
treatment. When striking a balance between children’s rights and conflicting norms and interests, 
there is one principle that should guide all decisions; the standard of the best interests of a child.332  
The standard of the best interests of a child is a fundamental principle of international law that guides 
all decisions concerning the welfare of a child.333 The principle is included in Article 3 of the CRC 
which reads as follows: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”334 
The best interests principle has since the CRC been applied in several international, regional and 
national provisions. It is included in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the wording of the 
CRC335 and in national provisions in different fields of law.336 The principle can as well be found 
from Council of Europe Resolutions concerning child marriage; The Assembly Resolution from 2005 
that prohibits States from recognizing forced marriages and child marriages concluded abroad sets 
exceptions on this matter by noting that a child marriage may be recognized “…where recognition 
would be in the victims’ best interests with regard to the effects of the marriage, particularly for the 
purpose of securing rights which they could not claim otherwise”337 and later in 2018, in its “forced 
marriage” Resolution, the Assembly urged again States to “refrain from recognizing forced marriages 
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contracted abroad but, where it would be in the victim’s best interests, recognize the effects of the 
marriage insofar as this would enable the victim to secure rights which they could not otherwise 
claim.”338  
In the ECtHR, the best interests principle is discussed often in matters relating to the protection of 
family life and especially in family reunification cases.339 Generally, ECtHR considers the 
maintaining of family ties as being in the best interests of the child.340 When it comes to family ties, 
family ties are often regarded as the relationship between the child and the parents.341 The ECtHR 
has held that “everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, 
to “rebuild” the family” and refers to the relationship between a child and his or her parents.342 One 
possible interpretation of the reasoning of the Court could be that when considering the interests of 
the child bride with respect to the recognition or non-recognition of a child marriage, the primary 
consideration should be that the child should be returned to her parents “except in cases where the 
family has proven particularly unfit.”343 In V.D case, where the ECtHR assessed the interests of the 
child, as one important factor, it took into consideration the living conditions with the parents.344 
When a child bride seeks asylum or a residence permit from Europe, it most likely means that she 
would be better off in Europe than in her State of origin when considering the living environment and 
her safety. The child may not even have parents and it is possible that the husband is the only family 
the child has left. As this study has already previously proven, a de facto relationship between the 
child bride and her husband may fall within the protection of “family life” and thus should as well be 
considered as a family tie that should primarily be preserved when considering the interests of the 
child. Moreover, returning a child bride to parents who have married her off at a young age may also 
expose the child to the risk of human rights violations. It can be argued that in such situations the 
returning of the child to her parents is not in the best interests of the child. 
 
How can it be assessed if it is in the child’s best interests to be reunited, or to remain with her husband 
and stay married? How is best interests defined? The term “best interests” is not defined in any 
Convention. Academic John Eekelaar defines the term as “basic interests, for example to physical, 
                                                
338 Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2233 (2018) para. 7.9. 
339 see Berisha v. Switzerland, app. no. 948/12 (ECtHR 30/07/2014), Mugenzi v. France, app. no. 52701/09 (ECtHR 
10/07/2014). 
340 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: ‘Handbook on European law relating to the rights of the child’, 
Council of Europe, 2015, p. 103. 
341 V.D. and others v. Russia, app. no. 72931/10 (ECtHR 09/04/2019) para. 114. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid., para. 118. 
 53 
emotional and intellectual care developmental interests, to enter adulthood as far as possible without 
disadvantage; autonomy interests, especially the freedom to choose a lifestyle of their own.”345 When 
considering the definition of Eekelaar in the light of child marriages, the fact how a child marriage 
affects the basic interests, autonomy and “freedom to choose a lifestyle of their own” cannot be 
disregarded. It could be argued that a child marriage cannot be in the child’s best interests as it 
strongly affects the basic rights of the child. However, The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe has held in its resolutions that a marriage shall not be recognized unless it is in the best 
interests of the child “with regards to the effects of the marriage particularly for the purpose of 
securing rights which they could not claim otherwise.”346 So a child marriage can be in the child’s 
best interests if the child bride claims rights, like the right to family and thus the right to family 
reunification as a consequence of the marriage. A refugee child is particularly vulnerable and even if 
a child marriage can be regarded as a fundamental human rights violation, the marriage may actually 
provide the child economic help and security. Furthermore, the explanatory report of the Istanbul 
Convention addressing forced marriage suggests that a forced marriage should have no legal effect347 
but also indicates that the annulment of a forced marriage “should not affect the rights of the victim 
of forced marriage.”348 
 
The application of the standard within different jurisdictions depends eventually on several factors, 
like culture, time and religion349 and interests of a child are seen differently between different 
families; for example a Christian parent rarely finds the circumcision of a boy for non-medical reasons 
as being for the child’s best interests whereas Muslim parents act in the best interests of their child 
while they circumcise their sons.350 When it comes to child marriages, the developed world rarely 
finds justifications for child marriages concluded at a very young age whereas in the developing 
world, child marriages are often a part of everyday life. Therefore, a debated question is; how far can 
cultural or religious norms affect the assessment of child’s best interests?351 How wide is the States 
margin of appreciation when it comes to child’s best interests? 
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Article 3(1) of the CRC itself answers to this question. The Article says that “the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration.”352 Primary, meaning the first consideration.353 Child’s best 
interests shall be the determining factor in only few situations; in adoption354 and in situations where 
a child is separated from his or her parents.355 In all other actions concerning children, child’s best 
interests shall be the primary consideration which shall be balanced between all rights of the child.356 
Therefore, the assessment and determination of a child’s best interests is not a simple process and the 
responsibility to ensure the fulfillment of the standard is on the States.357 Each situation should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. For example in Sen v. Netherlands, the ECtHR balanced with the 
rights of a child and “wider public policy interests” and while considering the interests of the child, 
took into consideration “the age of the children concerned, their situation in the country of origin and 
their degree of independence from their parents.” It is important to consider the involvement of the 
child’s parents in the child’s life,358 because if the husband is the only family the child has left, the 
dependency the Court considered in Sen v. Netherlands between the child and the parents could as 
well be the relationship between the husband and the child bride that ought to be considered.359  
 
The States shall also ensure that the child has the right to participate in the process. According to 
CRC, every child “who is capable of forming his or her own views” has the right express his or her 
views in matters concerning the child360 and therefore, it is important to give the child bride the 
possibility to express her views concerning the marriage and to make sure that all relevant experts 
are involved in the procedure of determining and assessing the best interests.361 Decision-makers must 
balance between all relevant factors and rights for deciding the best option for the child362 and in 
addition to the ECHR, all other international, as well as national legal norms must also be taken into 
account.363 
There is no “check-list” on the terms that should be fulfilled when determining the best interests, but 
it is a principle that must be taken into consideration when implementing all other human rights.  
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The ECHR must be read in the light of the principle but on the other hand, it can also help in resolving 
matters that are not covered in the Convention. It is a principle that can assist in resolving conflicts 
between different rights of a child,364  including the conflict arising from a situation where both the 
recognition, as well as the non-recognition of a marriage could expose the child to torture and ill-
treatment. Cultural and religious norms affect the assessment of child’s best interests, but according 
to the CEDAW and CRC Committees, marriages under the age of 18 should be based exclusively on 
the maturity of the child, not on culture or religion.365 Therefore, it can be argued that when assessing 
the interests of a child bride in a marriage, the marriage is in the interests of the child only if the child 
is mature enough for understanding the consequences of the union and for giving a full, free and 
unformed consent to the marriage. However, the child bride has also the right to express her own 
views of the marriage.366 Nevertheless, when giving weight to the views of the child bride, the 
maturity of the child is relevant too while the child must be mature enough for understanding the 
implications of the union.367 
In Finland, there is no total ban on the recognition of child marriages concluded abroad. Each situation 
is considered on a case-by-case basis and under each case the best interests of the child is assessed. 
While both the CEDAW Committee and the CRC Committee accepts marriages below the age of 18 
in “exceptional situations” as long as the child is at least 16 years old368 and the UN Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages allows exceptions 
to the rule of minimum age of 18 if it is in “the interests of the intending spouses”,369 the Finnish 
legislation allows these exceptions to be taken into account when authorities determine whether a 
marriage concluded abroad is to be recognized.370 
Per se, according to Finnish Marriage Law, a marriage concluded abroad is valid in Finland if it is 
valid in the country where it was concluded. However, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland 
found that a marriage concluded in Syria when one of the spouses was 15-years old was against the 
best interest of the child because despite of the cultural and religious background, migrant girls have 
also the right to freely choose their spouse. Therefore, the Court found that accepting the family 
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reunification application by the husband living abroad was against the best interests of the 15-year 
girl living in Finland.371  
As each situation should be considered on an individual basis and even if the first thought could be 
that a child marriage cannot be in the best interests of a child, a total ban on the recognition of foreign 
child marriages violates the best interests principle.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Child marriages are considerably addressed in both international, as well as in European legislation. 
However, even if the practice is prohibited per se, several jurisdictions unfortunately still allow it to 
happen. It is a widespread problem but affects mostly adolescent girls in the developing world as well 
as young girls within conflict zones and therefore, many refugee girls seeking asylum or a residence 
permit from Europe are married at a young age. Even if child marriages are prohibited in Europe with 
exceptions, there are no explicit international or regional provisions on how child marriages 
concluded abroad should be addressed within EU Member States. Therefore, a married child arriving 
to the continent brings about several legal dilemmas where the rights of the child are at stake.  
There have been differences in how EU States have responded to the issue of the migrating child 
brides but no simple answer on how they should respond. States have been forced to re-examine their 
legislation after encountering the issue of the migrating child brides and therefore, during recent 
years, there has been a trend in Europe where States have enacted laws concerning underage 
marriages by raising the minimum age for marriage, removing exceptions to marriages under the age 
of 18 and most radically, some States have enacted laws banning entirely the recognition of foreign 
child marriages within their State borders. States that have refused to recognize child marriages 
concluded abroad have become subjects of debate on whether the non-recognition of child marriages 
is compatible with the States’ obligations under international human rights law. 
This thesis analysed the extent of obligations States have towards the recognition of child marriages 
concluded abroad by seeking an answer to the primary question of this study: In what circumstances 
should a child marriage concluded abroad be recognized in EU Member States and when is it 
acceptable under international law to refuse to recognize the legal validity of such marriage? 
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There is no absolute obligation on States to refrain from recognizing child marriages to be found from 
international instruments. Even if the treaties and resolutions addressing the issue of foreign child 
marriages all condemn child marriages and urge States to refrain from recognizing such marriages, 
they all provide exceptions on the matter and accordingly, foreign child marriages can arguably be 
recognized in Europe if the child bride is at least 16 years old372 and if the marriage, or its effects, is 
in the best interests of the child. After all, all the international instruments addressing the issue of 
foreign child marriages give States a discretion to assess each situation on a case-by-case basis 
without an absolute obligation of non-recognition. However, even if there is no explicit obligation of 
non-recognition, States are nevertheless under an obligation to protect the child brides from human 
rights violations. 
Traditionally, human rights law has imposed only negative obligations on States. During the recent 
decades, the obligations of States have extended and today, it is widely accepted that States not only 
have to respect all the rights of individuals, they must as well ensure that the rights of individuals are 
not violated. Under the principle of due diligence, States are obliged to take all appropriate measures 
for protecting the rights of everyone within their jurisdiction and the obligation has also been 
extended to acts committed by private persons. Hence, States are under an obligation to protect the 
migrating child brides from the fundamental human rights violations the child marriage may expose 
them to. The positive obligation of States to protect the child brides from violations committed by 
third-parties and the principle of due diligence have most likely been the most important principles 
to be kept in mind throughout this thesis while without the State’s obligation to protect, the migrating 
child brides would not cause the legal dilemmas they now cause. 
The reason why the issue of foreign child marriages is not that straightforward is the fact that however 
a State decides to act with respect to a foreign child marriage, because of their positive obligation to 
protect, their acts may result to a violation of the rights enshrined in the ECHR. Even if a child bride 
was not within European borders, an asylum application may nevertheless bring the child bride within 
the jurisdiction of the European State concerned and therefore also under the protection of the ECHR. 
This study discussed primarily two rights enshrined in the ECHR that a foreign child marriage and 
its recognition or non-recognition affects: the prohibition of torture (Article 3) and the right to family 
life (Article 8) but took into consideration also the peremptory norms of international law in general 
within the scope of the ILC Articles. 
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A child marriage may fall within the scope of serious breaches of peremptory norms of international 
law regulated under the ILC Articles while child marriage may lead to either torture or slavery, both 
peremptory norms of international law. However, for falling under the scope of the Articles, the 
breach of the peremptory norm must reach a certain level of seriousness. A child marriage may reach 
the level if the breach is conducted with a level of intensity, intentionally and leads to severe 
consequences on the victim. However, each breach should be considered on a case-by-case basis 
while all child marriages are different in their nature and consequences and therefore, it cannot be 
argued that all child marriages would fall within the scope of the ILC Articles, even if they 
nevertheless may be harmful for the child. If a child marriage falls under the Article’s scope, States 
are obliged to refrain from the recognition of the marriage. If they fail to do so, they may be held 
liable for a serious breach of an internationally recognized peremptory norm. 
Even if a violation on a peremptory norm would not fall within the scope of the ILC Articles, it does 
not mean that the violation could somehow be justified; it nevertheless falls within the protection of 
the ECHR. ECHR Article 3 protects against torture. This thesis came to the conclusion that whether 
a foreign child marriage is recognized or not, the forum State may in both circumstances violate 
Article 3 of the Convention. While child marriage may in certain circumstances lead to torture or ill-
treatment, recognition of such marriage could thus mean that the recognizing State fails to protect the 
child bride from violations under Article 3. On the other hand, the ECtHR has applied Article 3 in a 
very broad manner and applied it for example on poor living-conditions too. If a child brides’ family 
reunification application is denied because of non-recognition of her marriage and the child is thus 
left in severe conditions in the middle of human rights violations that could fall within the protection 
of Article 3, the State that refused to recognize the marriage could be held liable for failing to protect 
the child from violations under Article 3. Whether a child marriage constitutes torture and its 
recognition could thus be regarded as a violation of Article 3, or whether the conditions where the 
child brides may be left because of a denied family reunification application are severe enough for 
falling within the protection of the Article must be considered on a case-by-case basis. It can be 
argued that in many child marriages the rights under Article 3 are at stake but while not all child 
marriages constitute torture or ill-treatment, an absolute line between the recognition and non-
recognition of child marriages concluded abroad cannot be drawn on the grounds of possible 
violations under Article 3.  
Article 8 protecting the right to respect for private and family life was the other conflicting norm 
discussed in this study through the protection it provides for “family life.” For a marriage to fall 
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within the protection of Article 8, it must be a legal marriage, or the union must amount to a de facto 
relationship. While a child marriage is not a legal marriage in Europe per se, courts have to consider 
if the union between a child bride and the husband amounts to a de facto relationship by taking into 
consideration several factors in the union, like the length of the relationship and the level of 
dependency between the spouses. If a child marriage amounts to a de facto relationship, a child 
marriage falls within the protection of Article 8 even if the marriage was not legal and would thus be 
protected from arbitrary interference by State authorities; a non-recognition of a child marriage that 
constitutes a de facto relationship would violate Article 8 of the ECHR. Moreover, because of the 
positive obligations of States, Article 8 also imposes and obligation on States to secure family life 
and to develop existing family life together, namely, to take all necessary steps for reuniting families. 
The positive obligation may oblige States in certain situations to allow spouses of a child marriage 
on its territory if it is the most appropriate mean for developing their family life together. An accepted 
family reunification application would thus mean that the child marriage must be recognized. 
Therefore, according to States obligations under Article 8, a total ban on the non-recognition of child 
marriages would not be compatible with international human rights law. As with respect to Article 3, 
also the right to family life requires that each child marriage is considered on an individual basis. 
Article 3 of the Convention is a peremptory norm of international law from which derogation is not 
permitted. However, Article 8 is not an absolute right and may be limited in certain circumstances. It 
can be limited in times of emergency and war, but the Article itself indicates an explicit limitation as 
well. The right to family life may be limited by State authorities when it is necessary in a democratic 
society for achieving a legitimate aim which, in this study has been regarded as being the prevention 
of child marriages. When assessing the necessity of a limitation to the right to family life, the interests 
of the State and the individual must be balanced and the relevant question at this point would be 
whether an absolute ban on the non-recognition of foreign child marriages is a reasonable mean for 
preventing child marriages. This thesis argued that a total ban on the recognition of child marriages 
is not a reasonable mean for preventing child marriages as it most likely obstructs also some underage 
marriages that are concluded with consent of the bride and are not violating the rights of the child. It 
must be reminded at this point that not all underage marriages are forced marriages or do not amount 
as human rights violations, they may as well be concluded in an acceptable manner as international 
law permits underage marriages in exceptional situations as long as the spouses are at least 16 years 
old. Nevertheless, when a child bride migrates to Europe, the marriage has already been concluded 
abroad and the receiving State cannot prevent it anymore, it can rather prevent it from landing within 
European borders.  
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Accordingly, an absolute ban on the non-recognition of child marriages cannot deter such marriages, 
so the right should not be limited for the interests of the State. However, the right to family life may 
be restricted “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”,373 namely, for the protection of 
the child brides. If the child bride is evidently in need of protection, the right to family life can be 
limited. However, the need for protection must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into 
consideration all facts of the case and therefore, a total ban on child marriages cannot be seen 
reasonable.  
For assessing the necessity of a restriction to a right, States have also been given a margin of 
appreciation to assess what really is necessary in their society. Even if States enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation with respect to family life and marriages, the margin of appreciation is not unlimited. A 
total ban on the recognition of child marriages cannot be defended with the margin of appreciation 
doctrine as “general, automatic and indiscriminate” restrictions fall outside States margin of 
appreciation.374 A total ban on child marriages can without doubt be seen as an automatic and 
indiscriminate restriction while it automatically applies on all married couples where at least one of 
the spouses is under the age of 18 and affects the family life of immigrants only. Furthermore, 
whenever States treat persons in a similar situation differently, they must have a reasonable objective 
to justify such treatment. The principle of non-discrimination is therefore a principle that must be 
considered at all times when the rights of the child brides are at stake. 
Yet another principle that may be used to legitimize actions regarding child marriages concluded 
abroad is the principle of ordre public. Even if foreign rights should primarily be enforced, ordre 
public constitutes and exception on this matter. A domestic court may refuse to enforce a foreign 
marriage if the marriage is contrary to the public morals and policies of the forum State. However, 
this principle is applied by domestic courts and thus cannot justify absolute bans on the recognition 
of child marriages. Courts consider each situation on a case-by-case basis and if the child marriage 
considered is in conflict with the forum States’ public policy and morals, the principle can justify the 
non-recognition of a foreign child marriage. 
While Article 8 of the Convention may be limited under the principles of proportionality, margin of 
appreciation or ordre public, limitations on Article 3 are never permitted. However, while both the 
recognition as well as the non-recognition of a foreign child marriage may expose the child to torture 
or ill-treatment, States can face a situation where they have to choose between the two bad scenarios. 
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Where there is a conflict of laws concerning children, or a State has to balance between two 
fundamental norms, there is one principle that should guide all decisions concerning children: the 
standard of the best interests of a child. All instruments providing exceptions on matters concerning 
child marriages urge States to take into consideration the best interests of the child. In a situation 
where Article 3 is at stake, the State must seek for the best option for the child bride and give the 
child bride the possibility to express her own views. The child brides’ own views are relevant as long 
as she is mature enough for understanding the issue at stake and can express her views freely. A child 
marriage, even if it is a fundamental human rights violation, may be for the best interests of the child 
if it enables other rights the child would not otherwise claim, or if the child is simply dependent of 
the husband and his economic support. Child marriages are rarely similar in their nature and 
consequences and all child brides come from different backgrounds, so each union should be 
considered with the best interests of the child bride in mind. 
All in all, the recognition of child marriages concluded abroad is a complex issue and there is no 
straightforward answer to the question whether such marriages should be recognized in EU Member 
States or not. There is no absolute obligation of non-recognition and in fact, an absolute ban on foreign 
child marriages is not compatible with international human rights obligations of States while it 
violates the child brides’ right to family life and may expose her to torture or ill-treatment. The 
conclusions of this thesis and thus the answer to the primary research question can be concluded as 
follows: All States are obliged to refrain from recognizing marriages that are concluded under the age 
of 16 and marriages that fall within the scope of the ILC Articles. All other marriages should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the principle of proportionality, margin 
of appreciation, ordre public and most importantly, the best interests of the child.  
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